Showing posts with label trustee. Show all posts
Showing posts with label trustee. Show all posts

Saturday, February 21, 2026

The Trustees Wake Up – NOT!

It’s nice to know that someone is reading my posts.

The NYS Open meetings Law requires that the NYCERS trustees adopt a resolution in public session appointing a person to the position of executive director.
That issue must also be on the public agenda for the meeting.

Discussions about the appointment can be held during an executive (closed door) session but the vote must be taken in open session.

At the February 12, 2026, NYCERS Regular Board meeting, the trustees admitted that they had voted to appoint Liz Reyes as the new executive director
during a closed door session of the December 17, 2025 NYCERS Investment Board meeting.

This item did not appear on the public agenda for either Board meetings.

In the open session of the February meeting, the trustees claimed that they were now giving public notice of the appointment. I guess, no harm, no foul.

The Legacy Replacement Project (LRP) Fiasco/Scandal and the Executive Director

At the same February Board meeting the LRP update was:

  1. Status red
  2. NYCERS and the “systems integrator” were working on the scope alignment and contract amendments
  3. Future updates will be included in the Annual Comprehensive Financial Report (ACFR).

I’m not being terse. This is actually what the project manager said. As always, no questions from the trustees on penalty of excommunication.

For the record, the ACFR is published once a year in December. Talk about “talking points”.

Reyes started the LRP project in 2015 and as of today continues to control the project.

In 2021, NYCERS signed the LRP contract. It was supposed to be a five year $84 million effort.

Since the spring of 2024 the project has been in a black hole.
In the FY- 2025 ACFR there is a promise to present a new plan at the April, 2026 board meeting and
a promise to finish the project by December, 2030.

Don’t hold your breath.

I can see why the trustees may have wanted to make the appointment in a closed door session.

Saturday, September 16, 2023

Is a New IT System Worth $487M?

In the spring of 2015, NYCERS initiated a five year project (LRP) to modernize its IT systems. It was supposed to cost $132M and take five years.

It is now 2023, and the first phase of the replacement project is still in test. NYCERS has already budgeted $329M as of FY-2024 for the project and is projecting another $158M as of FY-2027, the new end date for the project. That adds up to a total of $487M. NYCERS unfortunately has a track record of underestimating future costs. So we should expect a higher total cost assumimg completion of the project.

The NYCERS budget was $55.2M in FY-2015. If you project a 3% increase every year, the FY-2024 budget would be $72.0M. The actual budget for FY-2024 is $165.9M.

In 2014, the City experienced a runaway IT project, CityTime. You can read the DOI report on the NYC.gov website. Just search for "CityTime" on the website. The LRP project is starting to look a lot like the CityTime project. There is no evidence of corruption but there is a lot to support a conclusion of gross incompetence.

Sunday, October 23, 2016

Rejection of Index Investing at the Common Investment Meeting - This is Fraud.

So, the Comptroller has convinced the five city pension boards to attend a combined investment meeting, “Common Investment Meeting - CIM”, every month. Interestingly, the Teachers Retirement System continues to hold additional separate investment meetings every month.

The CIM is similar to a lecture hall class with 200 students as opposed to an ordinary class with 15 students. There is a certain circus quality to the meeting. You can judge for yourself. The videos are on this link.

I recently watched the September 26, 2016 meeting run by Scott Evans. He is the head of the Comptroller’s Bureau of Asset Management (BAM) and is paid $350,000 per year. The five pension funds actually pay his salary through a non-governmental grant scheme to the Comptroller’s revenue budget but the pension funds have no control over his hiring.

Comments on Index Investing

At about one hour into the show Mr. Evans started to comment on a possible simple index stock/bond investment strategy for the city's pension funds as opposed to the “sophisticated” strategy that the funds have adopted and he supports.

While he was not clear about what he precisely meant by the index stock/bond strategy, I am assuming that he was referring to the index stock-R-3000/core+5 bond strategy that NYCERS was using to a large extent circa 2000.

As of June 30, 2000, NYCERS had assets worth $43B of which $21B was in a Russell-3000 stock index and $10B was in a core+5 (Treasuries, investment grade corporate bonds and agency/mortgage backed bonds bond strategy, all with terms 5 years or greater) strategy. Together the two components were 75% of the total portfolio.

Specifically Mr. Evans stated that the index strategy would produce acceptable results, simplify the investment process for the pension funds, allow the pension funds to shrink the staff at BAM and have shorter investment meetings. He, however, claimed that it would be more risky than the “sophisticated” strategy and he made some vague reference to possible draw downs problems but nothing else.

That is basically the end of his discussion on this topic. He provided no quantitative support for his position. He felt his comment was sufficient to dismiss the index concept. No trustee asked any questions in spite of the importance and value of index investing.

What he failed to mention, however, was the actual historical rates of return for the two strategies. He did not list the radical differences in external fees, internal costs and taxes between the two strategies. He made no mention of the liquidity, volatility, currency, political, and credit risks inherent in the “sophisticated” strategy. He also failed to mention the potential of the “sophisticated” strategy for improper political influence and corruption which has occurred in the state pension fund in Albany and other public pension funds around the country.

Some Actual Numbers

In an effort to provide some specifics let me give you some historical numbers. Over the last 20 years (1996-2016) NYCERS assets have increased at annual rate of 3.4% per year, from $27.98B to $54.55B. See below.

From 1996 to 2000, as I mentioned above, NYCERS followed an investment strategy that was roughly 75% in a index/core+5 strategy with the other 25% in more dubious assets. The annual rate of increase in the assets for those four years was 11.3%. As of June 30, 2000 there were almost no private equity investments (non-publicly traded assets) in the NYCERS portfolio.

Since 2000, the annual rate of increase in NYCERS assets, using the quarterly numbers, has been 1.51%. Since 2007, that rate has been 2.88%. Needless to say, 2000 was the advent of the “sophisticated” investment strategy. By 2008 NYCERS was hip deep in shit with only 56% in the index/core+5 strategy. You can see that the trustees are not totally crazy.

Since 2009, NYCERS assets have increased at a 9.5% annual rate but the S&P 500 stock index has increased at an even higher 12.5% annual rate. As of June 30, 2106 NYCERS had assets of $54.6B. That number, however, includes a $3.2B positive cash inflow from 2009 to 2015 and $9.9B in non-publicly traded assets. The quoted values of non-publicly traded assets are basically guesses of what they are worth and you know the real number is less than $9.9B.

Based on the NYCERS official financial statements, which are different from the Comptroller's quarterly reports, the opening balance on July 1, 1999 was $41.9B and the closing balance on June 30, 2016 was $55.49B. That is an average annual increase of 2.53% for the seventeen years. The rate of increase for the S&P500 index/core+5 bond strategy with a 60/40 stock/bond allocation over the same 16 years is 4.648%. That translates into a $81.0B closing balance for June 30, 2016. That is a $25.5B higher than what NYCERS actually had. The sum of each year's difference individually is over $16.2B but compounded over the 16 years it is $25.5B. This is a big step towards full funding for NYCERS but we should be very aware that even indexing does not hit the 7% assumed interest rate that actuaries dream about.

Bottom line, NYCERS almost certainly would be in far better shape over any span of time with the “unsophisticated” index/core investment strategy. Of course, Scott Evans would be working somewhere else.

Listed below are the June 30 NYCERS asset values since 1985 as reported by the Comptroller in the quarterly performance reports along with closing balances from the CAFR's and estimates of index returns from FY-2000 forward.

  • Year - Quartely - CAFR CB - Indexing CB
  • 1985 - $10.178B
  • 1986 - $12.534B
  • 1987 - $13.866B
  • 1988 - $14.349B
  • 1989 - $16.499B
  • 1990 - $17.904B
  • 1991 - $18.852B
  • 1992 - $20.670B
  • 1993 - $22.939B
  • 1994 - $22.432B
  • 1995 - $25.455B
  • 1996 - $27.983B
  • 1997 - $32.439B
  • 1998 - $37.711B
  • 1999 - $41.024B
  • 2000 - $42.997B - $42.824B - $43.746B
  • 2001 - $37.519B - $37.251B - $40.222B
  • 2002 - $32.212B - $32.842B - $34.106B
  • 2003 - $30.841B - $31.524B - $32.477B
  • 2004 - $33,526B - $34.178B - $33.480B
  • 2005 - $34.703B - $35.526B - $35.406B
  • 2006 - $36.650B - $37.288B - $36.008B
  • 2007 - $42.237B - $42.514B - $42.707B
  • 2008 - $38.862B - $39.716B - $40.342B
  • 2009 - $30.929B - $31.903B - $34.490B
  • 2010 - $34.618B - $35.383B - $35.633B
  • 2011 - $41.623B - $42.409B - $42.107B
  • 2012 - $41,620B - $42.655B - $45.523B
  • 2013 - $46.623B - $47.194B - $47.862B
  • 2014 - $53.549B - $54.422B - $55.171B
  • 2015 - $54.289B - $54.889B - $57.106B
  • 2016 - $54.553B - $55.490B - $57.806B

Monday, September 19, 2016

Questions about the Comptroller's Investment Expenses

On September 8, 2016 the NYCERS Board of Trustee held their regular board meeting for September. The second item on the agenda was three resolutions authorizing NYCERS to reimburse the City for “investment” expenses incurred by the Comptroller’s Bureau of Asset Management from July 1, 2016 to March 31, 2016. The amount for the first quarter of FY-2016 was $552,461. We never got hear what the amounts were for the two quarters from October 1, 2015 to March 31, 2016 because the resolutions were tabled for the next meeting in October. I have written about these reimbursements in the past.

The reason they were tabled was because the Chair of the Board, John Adler, asked that they be tabled.

Why?

Because as the Chair stated the documentation supporting the expenses provided by the Comptroller’s Office was “difficult to decipher”. He stated he had questions and he wanted all three resolutions held up until he was satisfied that the expense were properly documented and appropriate for reimbursement from the corpus of the fund.

The Comptroller’s representative asked whether the Chair had communicated his issues to the Comptroller’s Office.

The Chair said that he had not yet done so. He further said that the documentation was very unclear, hard to decipher and was not in any standard format. This made it a laborious process to analyze. He also stated that this analysis had not been done before.

John Adler is a low key person who became the Chair of NYCERS in March, 2015. This is the first time since he became settled into his current position that he has had to deal with this budgetary flimflam. It, unfortunately, also occurs at the other four city pension systems and runs about $5M per year.

The Comptroller’s representative agreed that this type of analysis on the expenses had never been done before and asked for specifics on what the reporting format should be.

The Chair responded that the City had uniform directives about documenting expenses. He also stated that it appeared to him that the Comptroller, as the City auditor, was not abiding by those actual directives. Specifically he said that the Comptroller was sometimes using city expense rules and sometimes federal rules.

The Comptroller’s rep said that she did not think that different rules were being use and that she would be surprised if they were.

“I think you will be surprised” the Chair said in response.

To the casual observer this might not seem to be a big deal. Trust me, this is a big deal.

Friday, April 29, 2016

NYCERS dumps Hedge Funds

It appears that the NYCERS trustees have finally woken up. On April 14, 2016 the trustees voted to dump their hedge fund investments. What took them so long? Still there was one trustee who voted to stay with hedge funds, Teamster's Local 237. I find this position by a labor union very troubling

Now if they can only dump their private equity and real estate investments. But they can't do that, even if they want to. The idiots signed "no cut" contracts with no termination dates.

What is worse, is that they don't know what the contracts say. The Comptroller won't even let them see the contracts, contracts he signed. It gets even worse. The trustees authorize the Comptroller every year in June to continue this craziness for another 12 months.

I have written for a long time about this insanity. Don't let them tell you that they didn't know until now.

In a desperation move the investment community is attacking this action as being politically motivated. I'm sure there is a healthy dose of politics involved but the investment managers are terrified that if this movement gets going, they will all be taking orders behind the counter at McDonald's. That is if they get there first.

Wednesday, January 20, 2016

Renewal of the Lease for the NYCERS Disaster Recovery Site at Long Island City

In late spring of 2006 NYCERS signed a ten year lease for a disaster recovery site in Long Island City. It comes up for renewal this year.

As of today NYCERS still does not have a Certificate of Occupancy for the site. This means that there has never been a full fledged test of a recovery plan since legally workers are not permitted on the site. I have no idea how NYCERS can safely run their file backup system at this site when there is no permanent staff at the site. As far as I know there is no plan B.

NYCERS has an option to renew the lease for up to two five year periods.

What do you think D'Alessandro will do? What do you think the trustees will do?

Monday, January 4, 2016

NYCERS Investment Performance and Fees for FY-2015

As of June 30, 2014 NYCERS had a closing balance of $54,422.0M.

As of June 30, 2015, one year later, NYCERS had a closing balance of $54,889.3M

During FY-2015 NYCERS had revenue of $5,089.1M and expenses of $4,571.0M. That is a net inflow of $518.1M.

After the net inflow is subtracted from the June 30, 2015 closing balance, the adjusted FY-2015 closing balance is $54,371.2M. That is a decrease in assets for the year of $50.8M. This is essentially a no change in the value of the assets for the year.

During FY-2015, the S&P 500 index increased from 1960.23 to 2063.11 and the Barcaly's US Aggregate Bond Index increased by 1.86%. With a 70% stock/ 30% bond allocation, you should have had a target of 4.12% increase in assets for FY-2015.

At no point have the NYCERS Trustees made a public statement explaining why the fund performed so poorly or what they are going to do about it.

In conjunction with this poor performance NYCERS "reported" paying $231.8M in investment expenses for FY-2015. In FY-2014 NYCERS "reported" paying $184.6M. Listed below are the specifics of the $231.8M:

  1. $28.4M : general stock & bond managers
  2. $ 2.9M : Emerging managers - US equity
  3. $ 0.4M : Emerging managers - US Fixed inc.
  4. $ 7.0M : Junk bond managers
  5. $ 2.3M : Convertible Bond managers
  6. $40.4M : PE managers
  7. $12.7M : PE Opportunity & Global FI
  8. $31.7M : International Equity managers
  9. $17.8M : RE managers
  10. $39.8M : Hedge fund managers
  11. $ 3.5M : investment consultants
  12. $ 0.1M : legal fees (investment)
  13. $13.0M : PE organizational fees
  14. $ 5.1M : RE organizational fees
  15. $ 4.5M : PE Opp/Global organizational fees
  16. $15.5M : Foreign taxes
  17. $ 2.1M : Comprtroller's subsidy
  18. $ 4.5M : Miscellaneous

No one knows who the organization fees are paid to. That is $22.6M off into the great beyond.

Don't you wonder what the miscellaneous stuff was that the $4.5M bought?

What will the Comptroller's subsidy be in FY-2016 what with all the huge pay increase that the "investment" staff got in August?

This is all such obvious insanity. None are so blind as those who will not see.

Friday, September 25, 2015

When You Buy a Ferrari and You Really Need a Pickup Truck

What happens when you buy a Ferrari, when you need a pickup truck?

You pay 10 times too much for what you need, you don't get what you need, and you pay a lot for mechanics. What you do get is a fast car.

It's too bad that the NYCERs doesn't even get a fast car when they make the wrong investment decisions.

Here's the the bill for the mechanics. And once again NYCERS is not even getting Ferrari mechanics.

As of August 2, 2015 the Comptroller increased the salaries of his investment staff. The story is that the five city pension funds were convinced to pay for the increases through their mindless subsidy to the Comptroller's budget. Of course, that is an illusion. It is the NYC taxpayers and the NYC employees who are paying for these increases. In fact, the employees pay twice, once as a taxpayer and a second time through their pension payroll deductions.

All the lucky people listed below are provisional employees. I wonder how permanent civil servants feel about that?

This is in addition to the five investment consultants that NYCERS paid $3.2M in FY-2014. Consultants are not the managers who do the actual investing but "experts" who advise the trustees on how oversee the managers.

Salary Increases at the Comptroller's Office

Count Name Civil Service Title Assignment % Increase New Salary Old salary New Hire
1Scott EvansPension Investment AdvisorCIO 56%$350,000$224,359
2 Michael Garland Admin Staff Analyst Corporate Governance 56%$265,000$169,872
3John MerseburgAdmin Staff Analyst Public Equities93% $250,000$129,650yes
4Niel MessingAdmin ManagerHedge Funds 67%$250,000$149,701
5Alexis DoneAdmin Staff AnalystPrivate Equity 75% $280,000$160,000
6Martin GantzAdmin Staff AnalystFixed Income 62%$280,000$172,840
7Yvonne NelsonAdmin Staff AnalystReal Estate 69%$265,000$156,805
8Petya NikolovaAdmin Staff Analyst Infrastructure 59%$250,000$157,233
9 Miles Draycott Admin Staff Analyst$265,000
10Evan NahnsenAdmin Manager$180,000
11Noraina ParesAdmin Staff Analyst$130,000
12 Tatiana Pohotsky Admin Manager $160,000
13 Wesley Pulisic Admin Manager $180,000
14 Steven Veloric Admin Accountant $160,000
15 Scott Zdrazil Admin Manager $170,000
16 Marc Gross Admin Staff Analyst $110,000 $70,833 yes
17 Vistoria Hui Admin Staff Analyst $120,000 $85,000 yes
18 Janet Londond-Valle Admin Staff Analyst $130,000
19 Karen Barclay Admin Manager $160,000
20 Shachi Bhatt Admin Staff Analyst $160,000
21 Yi Feng Admin Manager $180,000
22 Millicen Budhai-Robinson Admin Staff Analyst $110,000
23 Eneasz Kadziela Admin Manager $130,000
24 Lakhir Kaur Admin Manager $110,000 $70,000 yes
25 Louis Lent Admin Accountant $110,000
26 Barbara Nersten Admin Accountant $120,000 $70,789 yes
Total = $4,875,000

Sunday, June 28, 2015

Follow Up on the IT Budget Boondoggle at NYCERS

On March 12, 2015 the NYCERS Trustees approved a $2.25M budget allocation to be squandered on a mindless IT conversion project.

On May 10, 2015, two months later, I released a sharp criticism, of the project.

On May 12, 2015, two days later, the NYCERS executive director, Diane D'Alessandro, released an unsigned memo notifying the NYCERS staff of the fabulous five year IT conversion project.

So after two months D'Alessandro finally decides to let the troops know what she is doing, exactly two days after I point out the insanity of her project. She starts as follows:

As you may know, NYCERS is embarking on a major information technology (IT) and business system project to replace our now 35-year-old legacy pension administration system - PROD, the core of all NYCERS business functions. The project, known as the Legacy Replacement Project (LRP), will affect almost every aspect of our work at NYCERS, taking at least five years to complete.

She carefully describes the vote by the trustees as follows:

At its March 2015 meeting, the NYCERS Board of Trustees conceptually approved the LRP and adopted a budget that funds early project phases.

She also announces an internal PR campaign:

This is major NYCERS project. As a first step, we have begun a series of meetings to brief everyone on the project and to get your input regarding the initial phase of planning.

Without doubt D'Alessanro will be looking to drag in a ton of consultants for this project. She does, however, want to ensure the staff that she supports them totally:

I want you all to know that NYCERS is committed to providing our staff with the resources and support necessary to ensure success at all stages of this project. We will continue to keep you informed and seek your input as we progress.

You can't make this stuff up.

Just for Laughs

As part of the $2.25M, D'Alessandro got $500,000 for a sole source contract with Gartner. Of that amount, $310,000, is supposed to cover the cost of producing a RFP for the vague conversion project. There is nothing vague about its $132M price tag.

So what does Gartner do? They go looking for a recognized public pension expert who has substantial IT background. That probably is a good idea, since they don't particularly know much about public pension systems. Needless to say, neither does NYCERS.

In turn, Gartner contracts with a IT staffing firm to find such an expert.

On May 14, 2015, this firm reaches out to such an expert with the idea of hiring him and assigning him to the the Gartner contract.

On May 18, 2015 the firm calls the expert and describes the assignment. It becomes quickly clear to the expert that this assignment is part of the NYCERS IT conversion fiasco.

I will let you all guess who the expert was.

The expert was kind enough to let the firm know that, in spite of his intense interest in the project, D'Alessandro would never allow him to work on the project.

Sunday, May 10, 2015

Budget Insanity at NYCERS

On March 12, 2015 the NYCERS Trustees approved the NYCERS FY-2016 administrative budget. It was Diane D'Alessandro's tenth annual adiministrative budget proposal as executive director.

The key numbers are listed in the table below. For comparison purposes I added FY-2006, my last budget as executive director, and FY-1996, NYCERS's last budget under the city's budget structure. The 1996 budget was draconian to say the least. You can see from the table that the NYCERS's budget has increased by 43% over the last ten years or 4.1%/year.

NYCERS: Admin. Budget Over the Years

FY-2016FY-2006FY-1996
FT Positions 401342155
PT Positions 35 130
PS $30.2M $20.0M$6.2M
OTPS $19.4M $14.7M$2.6M
Sub-total $49.6M $34.7M$8.8M
Fringe $8.2M $4.1M$0
Total $57.8M $38.8M$8.8M

What is extraordinary about this budget is that it is the beginning of a delusional spending spree on IT upgrades. It is being called the "Legacy Replacement Project". It proposes to spend $132M over a five year period, staring with $500,000 to be paid to Gartner, Inc. and $1.75M to other consultants to be named later. At the meeting D'Alessandro indicated that she was going to pay $310,000 to an outside firm to write a RFP for this "grand" project. Listed below is the five year spending bonanza.

  • 2016 - $ 2.25M
  • 2017 - $ 9.91M
  • 2018 - $27.86M
  • 2019 - $46.00M
  • 2020 - $46.24M

To OMB's credit they complained about the $310,000 RFP. The trustees, however, approved this budget in spite of making noise about the long term cost of the project.

You would think, considering how well funded that the NYCERS budget is, that the NYCERS staff would be able to write their own RFP. But D'Alessandro got that part right, her staff can't do the job.

Of course, without the results of the RFP where did the $132M amount come from.

In fact over the last ten years D'Alessandro should have been standardizing NYCERS applications on a current client/server platform using a relational database system. This process was underway in 2005 when she first appointed. But thankfully the old CICS/VSAM systems were so well made that they have survived long after the point when they should have been retired. Thank God for small favors.

D'Alessandro, unfortunately, was appointed to her current job in 2005 without any prior relevant experience by Martha Stark and a bunch of compromised trustees. D'Alessandro had never managed anyone. She is not a lawyer, nor an accountant, nor an actuary. She had never worked for a pension system and she had absolutely no IT experience. What she was and still is, is grossly incompetent.

To make the situation worse, the current IT director was working as the NYCERS call center manager when D'Alessandro moved her to the agency's IT division in 2007. At that point she had no IT experience either. Six months later D'Alessandro makes her the director of the IT division. It reminds of when Rudy put a key punch salesman in charge of DoITT. She is as incompetent as D'Alessandro.

D'Alessandro submitted a five page justifying her budget proposal. It is a classic example of using a lot of words to create a fog, lots of hand waving and saying nothing except give me $132M. I actually don't think D'Alessandro wrote the summary. Five pages is far too much work for D'Alessandro. It looks like a cut and paste job from some marketing crap.

This is the justification for $132M.

MAJOR PROJECTS

In a continued effort to provide greater operational efficiency, enhanced customer service and improved quality and production, NYCERS is proposing to undertake a major information technology (IT) and business system replacement project that will streamline and consolidate all applications and functions into a single data repository for common use throughout the agency.

The project which will be known as the Legacy Replacement Project (LRP) will be conducted in three stages over a minimum of five years. The LRP will require a commitment of resources to be phased in over that time.

In order to ensure the success of the LRP, NYCERS is proposing two associated projects including a communications project designed to accommodate expanded electronic interaction with clients and a change management project to address staff training, coaching, and leadership development needs.

You can always spot a IT disaster from the start. It has a long time frame and they don't tell you what they are going to do in the first week of the project, the second week of the project, third week of the project,... You get the picture. Oh yeah, it will also cost a lot of money. I will guarantee you that this project will fail.

When I left NYCERS in 2005, NYCERS had one of the best IT departments in the city. The agency had:

  1. between 60 and 65 IT professionals on staff
  2. an integrated mainframe (VSE) and a network system (Windows Server 2003)
  3. all major work operations automated running under CICS using VSAM and DB2
  4. an advanced web site which allowed members and retirees to view their own specific data.
  5. an imaging/workflow system covering all paper based applications for all members and pensioners.
  6. a dedicated document scanning division
  7. a tested computer disaster recovery plan (we were researching a full business recovery plan and site)
  8. a standardized accounting package running on the network supporting both pension and administrative operations
  9. a nightly backup process of all files including the Exchange Server
  10. a project to upgrade major applications to DB2.
  11. an advanced Avaya based call center with its own backup PBX.
  12. a modern customer service center with its own integrated queuing system
  13. an on-site fully equipped training center.
  14. a proximity card system for both time keeping and security.
  15. a separate network system for the security and a full camera subsystem.

Returning to the executive summary, it is not only short on details about the project but it also has a great deal of deceptive information. The following are a few quotes out of D'Alessandro's write-up along with some clarifying comments.

RECENT HISTORY

Over the past nine years, NYCERS has made significant infrastructure improvements.

Document Management

NYCERS continues to ensure the preservation and security of all vital records and to promote an environmentally sound approach to document management. This effort includes the incorporation of all incoming documents into the NYCEWORK system in an electronic format and the ongoing digitization of historical paper documents.

In 2014, NYCERS prepared, scanned and indexed over 200,000 incoming documents and converted over 1 million historical records into digital images. Since the inception of the document management project, over 38 million paper records have been imaged, saving approximately $600,000 in document storage fees.

From this quote you would think that document management was introduced during the last few years. In fact, it was there when D'Alessandro walked in the door. The system in place at that time used a software package called Staffware. It was working well but it was being stressed by the volume of documents that NYCERS was dealing with. It actually continued to function up until 2014 when a new software package, Filenet/NYCEWORK, was finally put into production. I wonder where the $600,000 in saved storage fees came from?

Unfortunately, while Staffware needed to be either upgraded or replaced, Filenet runs significantly slower than Staffware did. That in turn has created incremental delays at every step of every process in the agency. It has created havoc with the production levels for all major functions in the agency.

This is an example of a mismanaged project being put into production so that management doesn't have to say it made a mistake. We saw this problem with the CityTime project.

While we are talking about mistakes, there have been two major IT disasters at NYCERS in the last nine years costing millions of dollars. One was the DB2 project and the other is the infamous Long Island City disaster recovery site. At least when the DB2 project was cancelled, the bleeding stopped. The LIC-DR project is a never ending cancer.

When I left NYCERS in 2005, the IT department with the help of two consultants was slowly converting over our major VSAM files to a DB2 relational database platform. We had already had two significant systems running under DB2 but there was a long term need to shift all major files over to the relational model. Two months after I left the project was cancelled. Subsequently NYCERS entered into a contract with IBM/Blue-Phoenix to do the DB2 conversion. That project dragged on for years, cost millions, and eventually failed. NYCERS even tried to sue IBM but with very little relief.

Business Continuity

The Long Island City business recovery site enables NYCERS to restore business operations and critical applications in the event of a disaster. This ensures the sustainability of operations and reduces the potential for data loss. Business recovery time is within four hours and the data recovery point is within 30 minutes.

From this quote you would conclude LIC-DR is a success. That is not true in any sense.

The lease on the LIC-DR project was signed in 2006 and NYCERS still does not have a Certificate of Occupancy for the site. I have previously written about this mess. It is not clear what is the legal status of having employees on that site.

For the record, the rent at LIC-DR is $530,000 for FY-2016 plus another $400,000 for other ancillary lease charges. The site has serious water leakage, asbestos, and plumbing problem. The lease comes up for renewal in the spring of 2016. Let's see what the decision will be then.

And in this season of delusion, NYCERS is planning a tertiary disaster recovery site. They even started buying hardware ($250,000 in FY-2015) for this mythical site. Some people just don't get it.

Business Process Automation

NYCERS continues to streamline business processes and leverage infrastructure investments to improve service delivery. As a result, NYCERS has achieved efficiencies in areas including loans and survivor benefits. On-line loan processing time has been reduced from 10 business days to five business days.

In this quote D'Alessandro appears to claim to have automated loans and survivor benefits in the last nine years and that the turnaround time on loans has been dropped from 10 to 5 days. Actually in 2005 both loans and survivor benefits were fully automated. The loans were the first applications automated in the early 1980's and also the first application to be integrated into the imaging/workflow system in 2002. In 2005, if you filed a loan application by Tuesday, NYCERS mailed a loan check to you that Friday. You would wonder why D'Alessandro would have made the above statement.

While all this craziness was going on with the great IT upgrade, D'Alessandro also threw in a request for 12 new employees with salaries of $720,000. No explanation was given. This was on top of 6 new employees in FY-2015, again with no explanation. Since 2013 the full time staff has gone from 372 to 401 and part time staff from 12 to 35. Why are there back logs with production work? Can you imagine what A.C.S. could do with that kind personnel increase.

Wednesday, April 15, 2015

A Message to the New NYCERS Chairperson

You have a huge problem. Your designated investment manager, the NYC Comptroller, is doing a terrible job with investing NYCERS assets, this Comptroller and the last three. NYCERS has an average annual rate of return over the last 15 years of 2.89%.

The Comptroller, however, has the backing of DC-37 which is the largest city union and also a NYCERS trustee. Between the three city unions on the NYCERS Board and the Comptroller these trustees control four votes, a majority of the total seven votes on the Board.

These votes control investment decisions, disability decisions, the NYCERS administrative budget and the budget subsidies from NYCERS to the Comptroller. The three unions are bound together because of disability votes at the Board. They need to back each other up to be able to get closely contested disability cases resolved in their favor.

Without the annual investment delegation from NYCERS Board of Trustees, the Comptroller has very little political influence. With the change in the City Charter in 1990 the mayor essentially controls the Comptroller’s administrative budget. This totally compromises his operating capabilities and his political influence.

If the Chair wishes to provide some relief to the mayor from the city’s huge pension burden, he will have to take away the Comptroller’s power over investment decisions.

This is a complicated task. Since 2005, DC-37 has run NYCERS as patronage mill for its flunkies. That starts with the executive director and spreads throughout the agency. This also includes regular employees who have criminal liabilities and are more than happy to do as they are told.

As the mayor’s appointee to the Board of Trustees, the Chair will need to take on both of these political entities. This will clearly be a hard fight. The investment issue cannot be resolved without addressing the investment delegation and the internal rot at NYCERS. The Chair will have to convince DC-37 that it is in its long term interest to reduce investment costs and raise returns. He will also have to commit to totally honest and sympathetic votes on disabilities that come before the Board of Trustees.

In return DC-37 and the other unions will have to not vote for the annual investment delegation to the Comptroller in June. It will also mean, however, that DC-37 will have to accept reform within NYCERS because the Comptroller will no longer have any incentive to allow NYCERS executive staff to run wild with the agency.

In eliminating the Comptroller from investment management operations the Board will have to hire a truly independent investment consultant and hire internal NYCERS staff to track investment activity. You can see why NYCERS also needs to be reformed. Current investment consultants under contract to NYCERS have structural conflict of interest issues involving the investment community. A large part of their revenue comes from the investment community.

While the Comptroller is the statutory custodian, he has contracted out almost all of its functions. The Comptroller has even turned over the the pension payroll operations to FISA, another city agency. There really isn't much left of the old Comptroller's Office. Ed Koch really did out maneuver Jay Golden.

The Trustees should set the target for total fee expenses at 10 basis points. That would have saved $130M in FY-2014 ($184M-$54M). The Trustees could then focus on a basic Russell-3000 US stock index fund & core investment grade bond Portfolio. Maybe the bonds could be indexed also. This will make running the portfolio and hiring staff much simpler.

Note: As of June 30, 2014 NYCERS had $11.8B in US equity index funds with annual fees of $500,000 for FY-2014 with an annual rate of return of approximately 24.5% gross of fees. But at 0.4 basis points the fees don't really effect returns. Yes, that is correct. NYCERS only paid a 0.4 basis point, not even half a basis point for that return. You can see why investment managers get nervous when you talk indexing.

The Trustees can then drop all the garbage asset classes listed below. This won’t be easy because of the crazy contracts the Comptroller’s office has signed in the past. I consider these contracts illegal because of the secrecy clauses.

Asset Classes to be Dropped:

NYCERS: Unproducive Investment Classes: Values and Fees for FY-2014

Asset ClassFees PaidValue as of June 30, 2014Basis Points
Convertible bonds $2.1M $.5B 42
Bank loans $3.1M $1.0B 31
Emerging manager- US stocks $4.4M$1.0B 44
Emerging managers – Foreign stocks $.3M$.05B 60
Emerging managers – US bonds not reported $.1B***
Private equity $58.0M $4.0B (guess)145
Real estate $20.87M $2.3B (guess)90
Infrastructure not reported$.02B***
Hedge funds $15.5M $1.9B (guess)82
Emerging market/active $9.1M $2.3B 39
Developed Market equity $11.8M $5.4B 22
Junk bonds $6.9M$2.1B33
Opportunistic Fixed $16.3M $1.1B148
Foreign bonds $.4M$.3B13
Active US equity $14.2M $5.3B26
TIP bonds $1M $1.5B7
Subsidy to the Comptroller $2.3M
Foreign taxes $8.8M

Friday, April 3, 2015

The Comptroller's Office and Simple Arithmetic

NYCERS released its FY-2014 Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (CAFR) on Jan. 1, 2105. This report is submitted to the GFOA every year and is supposed to be a standardized financial report for all state and local government entities in the US. In addition, it is supposed to provide information to the general public, especially to actual and potential lenders, about the entity’s financial health and the level of risk involved with lending to the entity.

There is a significant section in the NYCERS CAFR dealing with investment details that are prepared by the NYC Comptroller’s Office. This is the first report produced by the current Comptroller. In this section on page 114 is a chart of the rates of return for the total portfolio and the major assets classes within the portfolio covering the three years 2012, 2013, 2014. There are also 3 year, 5 year, and 10 year averages. The chart alleges that the rate of return for the NYCERS portfolio for FY-2014 was 17.04% compared to a benchmark of 16.81%. There is no supporting documentation for this number but a reasonable person would conclude that it is accurate.

The audited income statement in the CAFR (page 82), however, tells another story. Based on numbers in the income statement which were signed off by the outside CPA firm, the opening balance for the NYCERS portfolio on 7/1/2013 was $47,194.6M and the closing balance as of 6/30/2014 was $54,422.0M. The income statement also indicates that NYCERS had a positive cash flow of $691.0M in FY-2014. Based on these numbers NYCERS had a total rate of return of 13.85% in FY-2014, (($54,422.0 - $691)/ $47,194)-1).

This same pattern has been occurring, at least, as far back as 2010 as you can see from the figures below drawn from prior CAFR’s:

  • - Year: Reported vs Actual
  • - 2014: 17.04% vs 13.85%
  • - 2013: 12.24% vs 8.81%
  • - 2012: 1.32% vs -1.14%
  • - 2011: 23.12% vs 19.39%
  • - 2010: 14.09% vs 10.68%

The other figures quoted in this schedule on page 114 are much more difficult to compute and I have no confidence that the Comptroller was any more successful with the math for these numbers. In particular, he quoted 15.2% rate of return for NYCERS’s private equity contracts. I suppose he is referring to the eight contracts that terminated in FY-2014. Of course, you might easily be misled and think that he was referring to the entire class. That would wrong and he is very carefully never to report rates of return for open contracts.

But let’s get back to 15.2%. Of the eight contracts that closed in FY-2014, either by exiting or sale on the secondary market, the Comptroller is not providing any cash flow histories for these contracts. Not only do I think the 15.2% is incorrect but I think the rate of return on these closed contracts showed a loss like the Allegra contract. If I am wrong, all we need is the cash flow histories on the eight contracts to compute their correct rates of return. If I am right, you will never see their cash flow histories.

What makes this more outrageous is that over the last 15 years, members of NYCERS have contributed $5.4B out of their own paychecks into NYCERS along with $21.8B of taxpayers’ money that has also been contributed. Oh, I forgot. Members are taxpayers too.

If the Comptroller’s Office cannot perform simple arithmetic, then the NYCERS Board of Trustees has a serious problem with renewing its annual delegation of investment authority to the Comptroller.

The fact that the rates of return are consistently inflated raises the suspicion that it was done on purpose. The investment figures are not audited. NYCERS actual average annual rate of return over the last 15 years is 2.89%, a little scary.

Sunday, March 29, 2015

By the Numbers – Private Equity at NYCERS – 2011 to 2015

Since 2011 NYCERS has dropped the following number of private equity contracts:

  • 2010 – 3
  • 2011 – 4
  • 2012 – 7
  • 2013 – 0
  • 2014 – 8
It is not clear how many of these contracts were standard exits and how many were sold at a loss. NYCERS has provided no cash flow history for these dropped contracts except one. That was Allegra in 2012. That is because I requested the information. You can read about the Allegra disaster in one of my previous postings.

It is reasonable to assume that most of these dropped contracts were equally bad.

Everyone knows that the private equity industry is feeding off of the US public pension fund structure. It is a malignant cancer but no one wants to publicly admit it because that admission would make the public pension funds look like fools and would put most private equity firms out of business.

Now, for the bad news. NYCERS has continued to enter into new private equity contracts since 2010 as you can see from the numbers below:

  • 2010 – 8
  • 2011 – 5
  • 2012 – 7
  • 2013 – 7
  • 2014 – 14
  • 2015 – 3 (as of Sept. 30, 2014)
You would have thought that NYCERS would be quietly trying to get out from under these flawed investment deals but no. There is no end to this stupidity.

NYCERS’s private equity fees for FY-2014 were $44.1M for 142 contracts allegedly worth $4.0B. Don’t bet the ranch on that figure. There is an added charge for private equity organizational costs of $13.9M (page 120). No one knows who this money was paid to except that it has a private equity label.

The sum of the two costs is $58.0M. That is 145 basis points or a 1.45% annual charge. Another serious problem is that NYCERS is not reporting 33 of the 142 contracts in its fee schedule on page 135. Enough said.

Monday, January 27, 2014

How Asset Allocation Can Have a Huge Impact on Returns

I recently posted a chart detailing the investment performance at NYCERS over the last 14 years. I contrasted NYCER's actual returns with the market returns for a simple index(stocks)/core(bonds) portfolio. In both cases the asset allocation was an "aggressive" 70% for stocks and a 30% for bonds.

The comparision showed a large shortfall between actual and market strategies. NYCERS actual asset value as of 6/30/2013 was $47.2B. The market value was $58.2B.

Since then I have done some further analysis using different asset allocations. The results were truly startling. Higher stock allocations are assumed to be riskier but offer higher potential returns. Stated another way an 50%(stock)/50%(bond) allocation should have produced lower returns but less volatility. The numbers tell another story all together.

In a snap shot, the list below shows the 6/30/2013 closing balances for the market index/core strategy over the last 14 years using different asset allocations:

  • 80%/20% : $53.2B
  • 70%/30% : $58.2B
  • 60%/40% : $62.9B
  • 50%/50% : $67.6B
  • 40%/60% : $72.3B
  • 30%/70% : $76.9B
  • 20%/80% : $81.5B

This experience is definitely tied into the last 14 years. Experts might question whether my simulations are refined enough. It is, however, clear to me that traditional thinking about calculating the efficient frontier curve is seriously flawed.

Over time NYCERS has scaled up its stock allocation. In 1985 it was at 30%. By 1990 it was at 50%. By 1995, NYCERS had shifted up to a 70%/30% position trying to catch the updraft of 1990's stock market. Since then NYCERS has never changed from this general allocation.

Not only have the trustees made very bad specific investment decisions over the last 14 years, they seriously misjudged the overall market.

No trustee could have been expected to push for 30%/70% asset allocation in 2002 but a 50%/50% position was well within the accepted range of prudent behavior. It would also have been much more successful. I light of the national pension crisis, we need to be more focused on the part that pension trustees have directly played in that crisis.

Blaming the benefit structure alone will miss the full extent of the disease. There are some who want the patient to die but we, as a society and a successful economy, will be far worse off without a healthy pension system in the United States.

This is a more detailed chart of NYCERS's actual June 30 closing balances and the simulated closing balances for the 70%/30% vs 50%/50% allocations over the last 14 years.

NYCERS - Actual Returns and Index/Core Returns (70%/30% vs. 50%/50%) from 2000 to 2013

Fiscal Year Actual Close Balance Actual Rate of Return Index/Core Return (70%/30%) Index/Core Return (50%/50%) Index/Core Close Balance (70%/30%) Index/Core Close Balance (50%/50%)
1999 $41.9B % % % $ $
2000 $42.8B 3.14% 5.52% 5.22% $43.8B $43.7B
2001 $38.1B -11.86% -7.58% -2.09% $40.0B $42.2B
2002 $32.8B -11.44% -10.82% -5.25% $34.8B $39.1B
2003 $31.5B 0.62% 2.36% 4.96% $34.0B $39.4B
2004 $34.2B 12.71% 12.08% 8.75% $36.8B $41.6B
2005 $35.5B 6.30% 5.56% 6.31% $38.1B $43.4B
2006 $37.3B 7.10% 4.23% 2.63% $39.0B $43.8B
2007 $42.5B 13.03% 14.75% 12.34% $45.2B $49.7B
2008 $39.7B -7.32% -8.10% -3.59% $41.9B $48.3B
2009 $31.9B -20.46% -17.50% -10.39% $35.0B $43.7B
2010 $35.4B 10.68% 11.63% 11.30% $39.3B $48.9B
2011 $42,4B 19.39% 20.94% 16.14% $47.8B $57.0B
2012 $42.7B -1.14% 5.01% 6.25% $51.0B $61.4B
2013 $47.2B 8.81% 12.26% 8.49% $58.2B $67.6B

Friday, January 10, 2014

2005 - The Year the Door Closed - Harassing Veterans

The following is a write up concerning veterans benefits at NYCERS. It highlights how NYCERS has changed its treatment of members since 2005.

Background

In 2000 the legislature passed a law allowing members of all NYS public pension plans to purchase military service (Chapter 548 of the Laws of 2000, eff. October 19, 2000, deemed eff. December 21, 1998). This law created Section 1000 of the NYS RSSL. The text of this section is listed below. I was the executive director of NYCERS at the time.

When enacted, the law allowed members who had served in the military during times of war to purchase up to three years of service credit in their NYS public pension plan. The cost was 3% of the 12 months earnings immediately prior to the date of the filing of their purchase application times the number years of military service being purchased.

As part of the implementation process NYCERS started accepting applications from all members who qualified. There was an additional requirement outlined in subsection 3 that the service would not be creditable until the member had been credited with five years of other pension service. At the time, NYCERS did not restrict applications because of this five year service requirement because the application subsections (1 & 2) did not impose this restriction.

Since 2005, the year I was terminated by the NYCERS Board of Trustees, NYCERS has imposed a five credited service requirement upon the acceptance of application under Section 1000. The effect of this requirement is to generally raise the cost to the member for purchasing military service rendered during time of war. This cost increase is even higher for Tier 6 members who must pay 6% rather than the original 3%.

Needless to say in my opinion NYCERS does not have the authority to impose this requirement on these members who have served their country in times of war. Based on Doctors Council, 71 N.Y.2d 669 the trustees do not have the authority to limit benefits without clear legislative direction. There is no legislative time limit on the filing of applications under Section 1000.

Discussion at the Board Meetings

Listed just below is the conversation from two NYCERS board meetings in 2011. The trustee representative for Local 100 of the TWU raises the issue of changing the NYCERS requirement that a member have five years of service credit before he/she can apply to purchase military service.

The TWU rep correctly states that the law does not impose a five year service requirement on the application filing process. He further states that he has been told that the Law Department has directed NYCERS , via email, that they have to impose this requirement. He also effectively counters the operational objections that had been raised by NYCERS staff.

From 2000 to 2005 when I was executive director, there was no such filing requirement. The law was totally clear to me. If the Law Department had sent me such an email, I would have asked them to send a formal memo. I would have also told them that there would be a response from me notifying them that in my professional opinion that the law did not impose a five year requirement.

I would, however, have followed their advice but there would have been a legal record of my opposition. The Law Department hates that type of documentation. In reality it makes them back off writing garbage.

In the comments from the DC-37 trustee rep there is no support for the TWU position and only a deference to the Law Department. In particular, her reference to her "fiduciary hat" is laughable in light of the investment disasters for which that the trustees are responsible.

In the current executive director’s comments she contradicts what I said about how these applications were processed from 2000 to 2005. She claims that the five year requirement had been in effect for 11 years back to 2000. Since she was not at NYCERS during that time, she is not in position to personally know what happened during that time. Any information she gets from the NYCERS Legal Division is totally compromised by incompetence and lack of honesty.

Also from her comments, it appears to me that she was aggravated by the TWU’s rep’s initial inquiry about this issue and his persistence in following up on it.

A little background on the people involved. The TWU rep, Mr. Rosenfeld, worked for NYCERS for many years. I don’t have a high regard for him. In this case, however, he is totally correct in his position. I suspect he and Ms. D’Alessandro have had contact with each other over the years especially when she was the third string alternate for DC-37 on the Board of Trustees and he was working at NYCERS.

Toward the end of his comments Mr. Rosenfeld in support of his position claims that the attorney at the Law Department, who wrote the significant email, said to him "Norman, you are absolutely right. It's not in the law, but there is enough language we can hang our hat on." I’m afraid that quote says it all about what is happening to NYCERS members since 2005. If there is any way to screw the members, do it.

At the end of the July minutes, the Staten Island BP rep very correctly asked the Law Department for a formal legal memo on the issue to be presented at the next board meeting.

Guess what? You can see from the September minutes of the next board meeting that the TWU rep dropped his request and no formal memo was ever produced by the Law Department. Too bad for the veterans but the city saved a few dollars. Remember that NYCERS paid $183.3M in investment fees last year.

Why did TWU drop its request? Maybe you should read a posting I wrote in 2009 about a change in death benefits at the Transit Authority.

Note: The date of the last regular NYCERS meeting minutes posted on the Comptroller’s pension online web site is October 13, 2011. It was obviously too much transparency for NYCERS to handle.

July 14, 2011 Board Meeting

MS. D'ALESSANDRO (executive director):

Resolution Number 37.

The next item on the agenda is the proposed resolution regarding military service.

CHAIRPERSON WOLPERT (Chair, appointed by mayor):

Mr. Rosenfeld, I believe you wanted to speak about this?

MR. ROSENFELD (TWU, labor trustee):

Yes, Madam Chair.

TWU is proposing a change in the way NYCERS is processing military buybacks. Article 20 of the Social Security law basically is like a three-page law, it's very short. It basically says if you serve one day during a time of conflict and the conflicts are listed in the law, you can buy up to three years of military time. The law goes on to say that -- but you don't get credit until you have five years of service, excluding the military purchase.

Nowhere in the law does it say that you have to wait five years to pay for it. The law does prescribe how a veteran pays for it. It's 3 percent of the 12 months earned preceding NYCERS receiving the application multiplied by the number of years you're buying back. So if a person is making $80,000 back from when he submitted his application, $80,000 times 3 percent, $2400 times the number of years he is purchasing.

Now, NYCERS has been told, I understand, by the Law Department, that because of the wording in the law, that they make the veteran wait five years to pay for it. Therefore, it's costing the veteran more money. I've had some members of Local 100 come to me and complain about it, that they put into the military and they only had like two or three years on the job and they got a letter from NYCERS that they can't pay for them until they have the five years, thereby costing the veteran more money.

There's nothing in the law -- you've seen the proposal, I think it was e-mailed to everyone. There's nothing in the law that specifically states that you have to wait five years to pay for it, just an interpretation. Based on the Richter case that the Corp Counsel attorney advised us in May, any trustee can make a proposal to the board to change an operational procedure.

That's what TWU Local 100 is attempting to do. I think it would be a big win for all the principals involved, and I think it would be a big win for NYCERS in the forefront of all the other Retirement Systems who are processing the same way, they're making the veterans wait five years and thereby costing the veteran more money.

Who in this room wants to make a veteran pay more money for the military time? I know there are procedural things that NYCERS has to do and we need to discuss it. I understand some of the trustees, my fellow trustees, might want to think about it, but I'll leave it to the Madam Chair to decide what we're going to do with this.

Again, there is nothing in the law that says the veteran must wait five years to pay for it. All it says is you don't get credit till you have five years of credit, excluding the military purchase. I've been told that it could be a burden to NYCERS. What happens if the person doesn't make the five years?

Now NYCERS has to refund the money. But if the person doesn't make the five years, he's going to get a refund anyway if he requests it, thereby terminating his NYCERS membership and most of the time people hang in there, maybe hoping they'll get another city job and come back. Why would a person pay five years -- pay for his military and not plan on making a career?

So in my opinion, I don't see that as the problem for NYCERS, they'd have to process the refund anyway if the person wants to get a return of his accumulated deductions, they just add the military money which is in a separate account as well. That's my proposal.

CHAIRPERSON WOLPERT:

Thank you, Mr. Rosenfeld. I have looked into this initially in addition to the Law Department's opinion that the NYCERS procedure is appropriate. I also understand that New York State processes requests in the same way, so that's one thing for the board to consider in looking at this resolution. I don't know if any other members of the board want to discuss or if they want to just take this under consideration and perhaps put it on the agenda for next month?

MR. ROSENFELD:

I'd be happy to take any questions from any trustee about it, if you have any questions.

MS. O'CONNELL (DC-37, labor trustee):

I think I do applaud TWU for taking the bull by the horns in trying to look at things with fresh eyes, I certainly applaud that.

My only concern is the fiduciary -- now putting on my fiduciary hat. If there is an opinion from the Law Department which I have not seen or read, which seems to say that Section 1000 requires waiting five years, I would like to hear, not necessarily today but maybe at the next board meeting -- regular board meeting not the investment meeting -- I'd like to hear from them a little more concerning that, a real analysis as to why this would essentially be violative of Section 1000.

Additionally, I would also suggest it might be good to hear from NYCERS in terms of operationally how these are processed. Maybe, again, at the next meeting. I applaud TWU for taking the initiative. I just think all the trustees would be well served to get the full picture before you vote on it.

CHAIRPERSON WOLPERT:

I think that's an excellent point. I think Diane actually wants to share some information with us.

MS. D'ALESSANDRO:

I just wanted to inform the board that when Mr. Rosenfeld raised this issue, we did considerable amount of due diligence with respect to our process and external processes, and with respect to the law, it went into effect in the year 2000, and so we have been implementing in this manner for the past 11 years, and we have never really received a challenge up until this point.

So we looked at the law internally and we felt that we were administering it correctly. Then we subsequently polled various Retirement Systems throughout the state and have discovered that they also do it, from an administrative point of view, consistent with the way we do it.

And then when Mr. Rosenfeld raised it again, we pursued it with the Law Department and we spoke to Jay Cook directly with regard to it and he sent an e-mail essentially -- I will pass it out, but indicating that essentially we were doing it appropriately. So that's the information that I have at this point, and we've been acting on that opinion. So perhaps we'll just hand out Jay's e-mail, either that or give the board sometime to –

MR. ROSENFELD:

If I may just address Mr. Cook's e-mail. I spoke to Jay about this personally. And Jay said, "Norman, you are absolutely right. It's not in the law, but there is enough language we can hang our hat on."

So that's where I'm coming from. It's not in the law, but there is enough language, the language being that you don't get credit for five years so therefore make the veteran wait five years means making more money because most union members, they're on a stepped-up basis. They come in with this lower salary and they get step-ups and by the fifth year they're at full salary.

And therefore the same military purchase, if he would have purchased it after one year or two years, would have cost him much less money for the same military service. So as a veteran, I'm looking out for their -- and especially my own members, I've had two of them come to me and complain that they got letters and that was it, it was a dead issue as far as they're concerned, they got a letter from NYCERS saying "Sorry, you have to wait five years."

So why would they go back to NYCERS and question it? They get a letter saying, you know, you have to wait five years, that's it, it's a dead issue as far as they are concerned.

CHAIRPERSON WOLPERT:

Mr. Zaccone?

MR. ZACCONE (rep for Staten Island Borough President):

I appreciate the e-mail that was passed around. I think it is really probably more equitable to the Law Department if we give them the opportunity to create a more formal memorandum as opposed to a short e-mail in response to the question.

So while that's helpful, I really think the Law Department owes us a more detailed analysis of this than a short memo here, and I'd ask that that be done. And if Diane can come back at the next regular meeting, along the lines of what Mary said, just on the procedures now in place and the procedures that may have to be put in place if there is a change.

MS. D'ALESSANDRO:

I'd be happy to do that.

MR. ZACCONE:

Thank you.

MR. SNOW (attorney from Law Department):

We'll follow through with that prior to the next regular meeting.

MR. ZACCONE:

Thank you.
CHAIRPERSON WOLPERT:
Any further discussion on this?

MS. D'ALESSANDRO:

The next item on the agenda pertains …

September 10, 2011 Board Meeting

MS. D'ALESSANDRO:

That's Resolution Number 41.

The next item on the agenda pertains to a Law Department memorandum regarding the purchase of military credit under Section 1000; and that was in response to a proposed resolution by Mr. Rosenfeld.

MR. ROSENFELD:

Madam Chair, TWU respectfully is withdrawing this resolution. TWU would like to thank everyone for their time and consideration in this proposal, especially the Law Department. And despite the disagreement with the Law Department's opinion on how this law is being implemented by NYCERS, despite that, TWU feels that the legislative route is the best route to go. And I want to thank everyone for their time and consideration. We are officially withdrawing this resolution.

CHAIRPERSON WOLPERT:

Thank you.

§ 1000. Military service credit.

Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, a member of a public retirement system of the state, as defined in subdivision twenty-three of section five hundred one of this chapter, shall be eligible for credit for military service as hereinafter provided:
1.
A member, upon application to such retirement system, may obtain a total not to exceed three years of service credit for up to three years of military duty, as defined in section two hundred forty-three of the military law, if the member was honorably discharged from the military and all or part of such military service was rendered during the following periods: (a)commencing December seventh, nineteen hundred forty-one and terminating December thirty-first, nineteen hundred forty-six; (b) commencing June twenty-seventh, nineteen hundred fifty and terminating January thirty-first, nineteen hundred fifty-five; or (c) commencing February twenty-eighth, nineteen hundred sixty-one and terminating May seventh, nineteen hundred seventy-five;
2.
A member, upon application to such retirement system, may obtain a total not to exceed three years of service credit for up to three years of military duty, as defined in section two hundred forty-three of the military law, if honorably discharged therefrom, if all or part of such services was rendered in the military conflicts referenced below, as follows: (a) hostilities participated in by the military forces of the United States in Lebanon, from the first day of June, nineteen hundred eighty-three to the first day of December, nineteen hundred eighty-seven, as established by receipt of the armed forces expeditionary medal, the navy expeditionary medal, or the marine corps expeditionary medal; (b) hostilities participated in by the military forces of the United States in Grenada, from the twenty-third day of October, nineteen hundred eighty-three to the twenty-first day of November, nineteen hundred eighty-three, as established by receipt of the armed forces expeditionary medal, the navy expeditionary medal, or the marine corps expeditionary medal; (c) hostilities participated in by the military forces of the United States in Panama, from the twentieth day of December, nineteen hundred eighty-nine to the thirty-first day of January, nineteen hundred ninety, as established by receipt of the armed forces expeditionary medal, the navy expeditionary medal, or the marine corps expeditionary medal; or (d) hostilities participated in by the military forces of the United States, from the second day of August, nineteen hundred ninety, to the end of such hostilities in case of a veteran who served in the theater of operations including Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, the Gulf of Aden, the Gulf of Oman, the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, and the airspace above these locations.
3.
A member must have at least five years of credited service (not including service granted hereunder) to be eligible to receive credit under this section.
4.
To obtain such credit, a member shall pay such retirement system, for deposit in the fund used to accumulate employer contributions, a sum equal to the product of the number of years of military service being claimed and three percent of such member's compensation earned during the twelve months of credited service immediately preceding the date that the member made application for credit pursuant to this section. If permitted by rule or regulation of the applicable retirement system, the member may pay such member costs by payroll deduction for a period which shall not exceed the time period of military service to be credited pursuant to this section. In the event the member leaves the employer payroll prior to completion of payment, he or she shall forward all remaining required payments to the appropriate retirement system prior to the effective date of retirement. If the full amount of such member costs is not paid to the appropriate retirement system prior to the member's retirement, the amount of service credited shall be proportional to the total amount of the payments made prior to retirement.
5.
In no event shall the credit granted pursuant to this section, when added to credit granted for military service with any retirement system of this state pursuant to this or any other provision of law, exceed a total of three years.
6.
To be eligible to receive credit for military service under this section, a member must make application for such credit before the effective date of retirement. Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this subdivision, an individual who retired on or after December twenty-first, nineteen hundred ninety-eight and before the effective date of this section may make application for credit pursuant to this section within one year following the effective date of this section, in which event, the cost to the retiree would be based on the twelve month period immediately preceding retirement.
7.
All costs for service credited to a member pursuant to this section, other than the member costs set forth in subdivision three of this section, shall be paid by the state and all employers which participate in the retirement system in which such member is granted credit.
8.
A member who has purchased military service credit pursuant to section two hundred forty-four-a of the military law shall be entitled to a refund of the difference between the amount paid by the member for such purchase and the amount that would be payable if service had been purchased pursuant to this section.
9.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in the event of death prior to retirement, amounts paid by the member for the purchase of military service credit pursuant to this section shall be refunded, with interest, to the extent the military service purchased with such amounts does not produce a greater death benefit than would have been payable had the member not purchased such credit. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in the event of retirement, amounts paid by the member for the purchase of military service credit pursuant to this section shall be refunded, with interest, to the extent the military service purchased with such amounts does not produce a greater retirement allowance than would have been payable had the member not purchased such credit.
10.
Anything to the contrary in subdivision four of this section notwithstanding, to obtain such credit, a member who first joins a public retirement system of the state on or after April first, two thousand twelve shall pay such retirement system, for deposit in the fund used to accumulate employer contributions, a sum equal to the product of the number of years of military service being claimed and six percent of such member's compensation earned during the twelve months of credited service immediately preceding the date that the member made application for credit pursuant to this section.

Sunday, December 1, 2013

The New Chair of the NYCERS Board of Trustees

Mayor de Blasio will soon be appointing a new commissioner for the Department of Finance. The position, unfortunately, has a tradition of being filled with political operatives as opposed to public finance/taxation professionals.

The commissioner is, ex officio, a trustee of both the city police and fire pension funds.

The mayor will also be appointing his representative on both the NYCERS and TRS Boards of Trustees. The Mayor can appoint anyone to these two unpaid positions. On the NYCERS board the mayor's representative is the statutory chair. At TRS the chair is elected by the trustees.

Because of the mayor's enormous political and budgetary power, the mayor's representative is the most important member of the NYCERS Board of Trustees.

Prior to 1990, the power structure of the NYCERS Board of Trustees, to a large extent, mirrored the Board of Estimate which was the original governing body of NYCERS up until 1968. With the destruction of the Board of Estimate in 1990 the mayor's power within the city increased radically. That was alos true at NYCERS.

While the mayor's representative has only one vote, it is the most important vote. Even a dissenting vote from the chair on an investment decision is a warning signal to the other trustees.

Mayor Bloomberg's appointees to the NYCERS and the TRS Boards have been a disaster. The mayor has constantly complained about the rising costs of pensions during his three terms but his representatives have failed to control investment costs or institute a sound investment strategy that earns a market rate of return.

Mayor de Blasio's appointee will have the challenge of bringing the annual investment costs for the five pension funds down from the $472.5M (FY-2013) to a rational annual amount of $100M (FY-2002) along with pushing to adopt an index/core strategy which has the potential to earn on average an additional $1.5B a year in asset value for the five city pension funds.

With respect to NYCERS here are some operational recommendations that I hope the mayor's new representative considers:

  1. Hire a totally independent investment consultant with no revenue connections to the investment management community.
  2. Make all investment contracts public record and provide every trustee with a copy of each contract. It is most likely that the trustees have never seen any of these contracts.
  3. Make the Board's investment meetings totally open for all items unless the Law Department gives written direction that a specific item must be dealt with in executive session.
  4. Put in place a tight accounting control of the invoice/payment process for all investment expenses and publicly report all payments to the trustees at each meeting and once a year provide the trustees with a copy of the final annual reconciliation of investment expenses for the year.
  5. Utilize the NYCERS web site to provide public disclosure of investment data and decisions. The Comptroller's attempt in this area has failed to deliver on the information it promised to provide.
  6. Make available to the trustees the full cash flow history of each private equity, real estate, and hedge fund contract on a real time basis. (NYCERS web site)
  7. Explore the feasbilty of dropping of all asset classes that do not fit within a index/core strategy.
  8. Set 10 basis points as the general limit on fees for all investment contracts. I suspect that this will be a very effective screen for unproductive investments.
  9. Almost certainly drop all emerging manager contracts unless their fees are brought under the 10 basis point limit.
  10. Review the quality of NYCERS's senior administrative management. This staff was put in place while Martha Stark was chair.
  11. On an annual basis provide the trustees with a copy of a complete reconciliation of administrative expenses, This report was dropped in FY-2010. (NYCERS web site)
  12. Radically upgrade the agency's monthly production report to include open and closing transaction balances along with incoming work, work completed during the month, and aging information on the outstanding work. (NYCERS web site)

Wednesday, November 20, 2013

Reality Comes to NYCERS -- Funding Status 2007 - 2013

Below is the NYCERS funded ratio for the last seven years. It charts out a serious problem for NYCERS and in turn for the members, retirees, and the taxpayers of New York City.

This problem is in large part due to the failure of the NYCERS trustees to properly invest the assets of the fund over the last 14 years. See NYCERS income statement history .

Over the last 14 years NYCERS has earned an annual rate of return of 2.11%. From my calculations the index/core strategy would have enabled NYCES to achieve a 3.59% return over the same period. Both of which are significantly short of the 8%/7% actuarial interest rate (AIR) that NYCERS has been using for the last 14 years.

This is a classic "Catch 22" situation. The 8%/7% allowed the city to contribute less to NYCERS in the short term but motivated the NYCERS trustees to adopt an irresponsible investment strategy which allegedly would achieve the 8%/7% target. The end result was under-funding, underperformance, and ironically causing the city to pay more to NYCERS over the long run.

I do not have any concrete evidence of corruption but at some point incompetence rises to the level of criminal.

As of FY-2000, NYCERS had 71% of its assets in a index/core strategy. In 2013, NYCERS had only 39% in a index/core strategy and another 16% in illiquid assets which create uncertainty about the real value of the assets.

Fiscal Year Actuarial Assets Accrued Liability Unfunded Liability Funded Ratio Covered Pyrl Unfunded as % of Pyrl
2013 $42.41B $65.27B $22.86B 65.0% $12.23B 186.9%
2012 $40.33B $62.94B $22.50B 64.2% $12.10B 185.9%
2011 $41.71B $53.05B $11.34B 78.6% $11.88B 95.5%
2010 $40.72B $51.11B $10.39B 79.7% $11.31B 91.9%
2009 $38.93B $49.25B $10.33B 79.0% $10.76B 96.0%
2008 $38.37B $46.60B $8.23B 82.3% $10.13B 81.3%
2007 $39.69B $39.80B $0.10B 99.7% $9.67B 1.1%
.... .... .... .... .... .... ....
2000 $42.39B $42.42B $0.03B 99.9% $7.87B 0.3%

As of July 1, 2011 NYCERS changed actuarial valuation methods going from "frozen initial liability" to "entry age". In simple English, NYCERS started using a real actuarial method as opposed to a delusional one. And I mean "deluuusional" in the way Lewis Black uses it in his comedy routines. NYCERS also switched actuarial interest rates from 8% gross of expenses to 7% net of expenses.

You can clearly see how the NYCERS pension liabilities jumped from $53.1B to $62.9B in 2012 because of the switch from 8% to 7%. You can just imagine what the accrued pension liabilities would be if the actuary used the real rate of return of 2.11%. A straight linear projection would produce an added $50.0B. That is the cost of bad investment decisions.

In 2008, the NYCERS actuary started providing the "entry age" numbers as supplementary information in the CAFR in order to supply the public with better disclosure on NYCERS funding status. That is why my chart changes dramatically from 2007 to 2008. Page 127 in the FY-2013 NYC CAFR shows the the change occurring in 2012 instead of 2008. Everyone tries to delay bad news.

Any funded ratio below 80% is a sign of trouble. The other four city pension funds, unfortunately, have much lower funded ratios than NYCERS.

Monday, October 21, 2013

Stop the Bleeding - Public Pension Funds Under Attack - Report and NY Times article

I have been hammering the NYCERS trustees for several years about about their investment decisions, in particular, allocations to private equity, real estate partnerships, and hedge funds.

Now there is a growing record of how misplaced these investments are for public pension funds.

Read the October 20, 2013 NY Times article by Gretchen Morgenson, Ted Seidle's recap article in Forbes on the investigation to the assault on the Employee Retirement System of Rhode Island, and the broad sweeping expose in Rolling Stone magazine.

Here is the link to the full investigative report.

Maybe the new mayor could find the money for his pre-K program by stopping the bleeding of the pension funds by Wall Street.

Tuesday, September 3, 2013

What Happened to the Perjury Investigation at NYCERS - Thompson & de Blasio

In 2009, four years ago, the Public Adovcate and the Comptroller, both NYCERS trsutees, requested D.O.I. to investigate a charge of perjury and official misconduct by senior management at NYCERS. As of today there has been no resolution of those charges. The trustees made this request in response to specific evidence that I had given to the trustees of the perjury by NYCERS senior staff.

In 2009, Bill Thompson was a NYCERS trustee and the Public Advocate's office made the actual request for the investigation. In 2010, de Blasio became the Public Advocate and a NYCERS trustee.

Thompson and de Blasio are now running for mayor of New York City. Shouldn't they clear up this unfinished business before they take on the responsibilities of mayor? Scott Stringer was also a NYCERS trustee in 2009 and has equal responsibility for cleaning up this mess.