Sunday, December 13, 2009

EMS Disability Retirees -- August 11, 2008 Letter to EMS Retirees Association

This is the first in a series of items that I will be posting. They will outline a vendetta that Karen Mazza has undertaken against disabled EMS retirees.

August 11, 2008

Ms. Marianne Pizzitola

FDNYEMS Retirees Association, Inc. -- PO Box 260153 -- Bellerose, NY 11426

Dear Ms. Pizzitola:

I am writing in response to your August 11, 2008 letter requesting an analysis of the attached May 5, 2008 letter from Karen Mazza concerning NYCERS’s new earnings limits for disabled retirees who retired under Section 607-b of the NYS Retirement and Social Security Law (RSSL). For the record I was the executive director at NYCERS from 1990 to 2005, deputy executive director from 1986 to 1990, and deputy director of information technology from 1977 to 1986.

The May 5, 2008 letter from Karen Mazza to Dennis Sullivan appears to notify District Council 37 of the reinterpretation of RSSL Section 607-b, a line of duty disability benefit for EMS workers. Locals 2507 and 3621 represent those workers and belong to DC-37. It is interesting that DC-37 needed to be notified since DC-37 is a full voting member of the Board of Trustees which administers NYCERS. DC-37 would have had to vote on any change in NYCERS rules.

Ms. Mazza states that according to the new interpretation retirees under Section 607-b are now subject to an annual earnings limitation, both public and private sector, equal to $26,000 during 2007.

She claims that the NYC Law Department affirms this new finding. She does not, however, provide a copy of the NYC Law Department’s confirmation or interpretation. My experience with Ms Mazza leads me to doubt that such written confirmation or interpretation exists. Verbal statements are useless as Ms. Mazza should know.

In addition, Ms. Mazza is not authorized to make legal determinations on NYCERS pension statutes. That authority rests solely with the NYC Law Department.

Ms. Mazza attempts to justify the new interpretation by pointing out the following clause in Section 607-b “subject to the provisions of subdivision c of Section 605 of this article”. She then incorrectly argues that this wording imposes the Section 605 gainful employment criteria on Section 607-b retirees and in turn the amellorative earnings definition adopted by the NYCERS trustees in response to 1983 legislation.

Ms. Mazza refers to the resolution and rules adopted by the trustees in 1983 in conjunction with the passage of Section 605 into law. Please note Ms. Mazza does not provide copies of the resolution or rules. Ms. Mazza was not present in 1983 when the trustees were dealing with Section 605. I, however, was.

In 1983 the state legislature enacted a new disability benefit to replace the Tier 3 ordinary and accident benefits (Sections 506 & 507) which were dependent on the Social Security Administration for a determination of disability. Depending on an outside agency caused serious operational problems for the five effected NYS retirement systems (NYSLERS, NYSTRS, NYCERS, NYCTRS, and BERS).

The new Sections 605 and 507-a returned the disability determination to the associated five retirement systems but incorporated the gainful employment concept used by the Social Security Administration into the new statutes. Specifically Section 605 states:

“If the retirement system determines that the member is physically or mentally incapacitated for the performance of gainful employment, and that he was so incapacitated at the time he ceased his performance of duties and ought to be retired for disability, he shall be so retired.”

This still presented the trustees with a serious problem. On its face Section 605 only allows a member to retire for disability if he/she was determined to be physically or mentally incapacitated for the performance of gainful employment.

This is different than the traditional Tier 1 & 2 performance of the duties of member’s current job title. This meant a bus driver who lost both his legs in a bus accident would be denied disability because he/she could work at a desk job. It would also inevitably create pressure to have employers provide alternative employment for injured employees who were denied disability benefits. Management was not happy with that prospect.

As a compromise the NYCERS trustees and the NYC Law Department established a dollar threshold as a proxy for the gainful employment criteria. As long as a retiree was disabled with respect to the duties of his/her job title and did not earn more than $13,000/year (indexed for inflation, $26,000 in 2007), he/she was deemed not to be gainfully employed.

This was an easing of a requirement, not an imposition of a limitation. While it was an improvement over a strict interpretation of gainful employment, it was still harsh. If a retiree earned more than $13,000, he/she permanently lost the disability benefit on the theory that he/she was capable of gainful employment.

This is not an annual earnings limit. It was a marker for the performance of gainful employment. Section 605 does not authorize the Board of Trustees to impose annual earnings limitations on disabled retirees, only to determine if they are disabled and continue to be disabled as time goes on.

Section 607-b is fundamentally a different type of disability benefit from Section 605. It is a ¾ quarters line of duty benefit granted to a member if he/she is etermined to be physically or mentally incapacitated for the performance of his/her duties, and not the performance of gainful employment. See the following wording of Section 607-b:

“becomes physically or mentally incapacitated for the performance of duties as the natural and proximate result of an injury, sustained in the performance or discharge of his or her duties shall be paid a performance of duty disability retirement allowance equal to three-quarters of final average salary, subject to the provisions of subdivision c of section six hundred five of this article,…”

The reference to Section 605.c does not bring gainful employment into play for this benefit. The specific wording of Section 607-b quoted above supersedes the “gainful employment” criteria of Section 605.c which Ms. Mazza mistakenly depends on. Contrast the Section 607-b words above with the Section 605 words below:

“If the retirement system determines that the member is physically or mentally incapacitated for the performance of gainful employment, and that he was so incapacitated at the time he ceased his performance of duties and ought to be retired for disability, he shall be so retired.”

They are in conflict and clearly the Section 607-b takes precedence. In fact, Section 607-b.b carves out a special line of duty presumption for a member who contracts HIV, tuberculosis, or hepatitis. This clearly shows that these conditions are considered disabling independent of the gainful employment criteria.

It is rather the following portion of Section 605.c that is applicable:

“Each retirement system shall be entitled to adopt appropriate procedures for making the foregoing determination, including but not limited to the conducting of medical examinations, if any, for the purpose of determining initial entitlement of an applicant for disability retirement or to continued entitlement to a disability retirement allowance. Such retirement shall be effective as of a date approved by the head of the retirement system.”

This provision addresses the determination of the original disability and the continued existence of that disability. Performance of duties, not gainful employment is the criteria, clearly stated in Section 607-b. Again, as stated above, Section 605.c does not authorize the trustees to impose earnings limitations on disabled retirees.

Section 607-b was designed to provide a special disability benefit to EMS members who were injured in the line of duty. Absent clear language, similar to Section 13-171 of NYC Administrative Code, the trustees have no authority to impose earnings limitations on this benefit. This was the original interpretation adopted by NYCERS and it is the correct interpretation.

It should be noted that the legislature clearly incorporated Section 13-176 of the NYC Administrative Code into Section 607-b but chose not to include Section 13-171 of that code.

Ms Mazza refers to “gainful employment safeguards”. This is a mistaken use of words in Tier 4. As I indicated above, there is a safeguards provision in Tier 1 & 2 (Section 13-171 Safeguards on disability retirement, NYC Admin Code), but there is no such provision in Tier 3 or 4.

From my personal experience with Ms. Mazza she has very poor legal insight due to her aversion to reading the applicable statutes, her lack of overall effort, and the limited time she spends in the office. She has also had serious ethical lapses which are indicative of poor judgment on her part.

It is unfortunate that the trustees have allowed Ms. Mazza to be in a position where she can improperly deny benefits to members and retirees of NYCERS.

Sincerely yours, John J. Murphy

Cc: Inga Van Eysden, NYC Law Department Dennis Sullivan, DC-37

 
§  605.  Disability retirement.  a.  Application  for  a disability
  retirement allowance for a member may be made by:
    1. Such member, or
    2. The head of the department in which such member is employed.
    b. At the time of the  filing  of  an  application  pursuant  to  this
  section, the member must:
    1. Have at least ten years of total service credit, and
    2.  The  application  must  be filed within three months from the last
  date the member was being paid on the payroll  or,  in  the  case  of  a
  member  who was placed on a leave of absence for medical reasons without
  pay, either voluntarily or involuntarily, at the time  he  ceased  being
  paid,  application  may  be  made not later than twelve months after the
  date the employee receives notice that his employment  status  has  been
  terminated.    In  the  case of a member of the New York state teachers'
  retirement system, the application must be filed not later  than  twelve
  months  after the last date the member was being paid on the payroll or,
  where the member was placed on leave  of  absence  for  medical  reasons
  without  pay, either voluntarily or involuntarily at the time the member
  ceased being paid, not later than  twelve  months  after  the  date  the
  member  receives  notice  that  the  member's employment status has been
  terminated.
    3. Provided, however, if the retirement system  determines  that  such
  member  was  physically  or  mentally  incapacitated  for performance of
  gainful employment as the natural and proximate result  of  an  accident
  not caused by his own willful negligence sustained in the performance of
  his  duties  in active service while actually a member of the retirement
  system the requirement that the member should have ten years of credited
  service shall be inapplicable.
    c. If the retirement system determines that the member  is  physically
  or mentally incapacitated for the performance of gainful employment, and
  that  he  was  so incapacitated at the time he ceased his performance of
  duties and ought to be retired for disability, he shall be  so  retired.
  Each retirement system shall be entitled to adopt appropriate procedures
  for making the foregoing determination, including but not limited to the
  conducting   of  medical  examinations,  if  any,  for  the  purpose  of
  determining  initial  entitlement  of  an   applicant   for   disability
  retirement  or  to  continued  entitlement  to  a  disability retirement
  allowance. Such retirement shall be effective as of a date  approved  by
  the head of the retirement system.
    d.  Upon  retirement  for  disability  one of the following retirement
  allowances shall be payable:
    1. In the case of a member of a retirement system other than  the  New
  York  city  employees'  retirement  system,  the  New York city board of
  education retirement system or the New York  city  teachers'  retirement
  system,  if  the  member  has  attained  age  sixty when such retirement
  becomes effective, his retirement allowance shall be equal to that which
  he would receive in the case of service retirement at normal  retirement
  age  based on his credited service but in no event shall such retirement
  allowance exceed the amount he would receive pursuant to  paragraph  two
  of this subdivision.
    2.  In  the case of a member of a retirement system other than the New
  York city employees' retirement system,  the  New  York  city  board  of
  education  retirement  system  or the New York city teachers' retirement
  system, if the member has not attained age sixty  when  such  retirement
  becomes   effective,   his  retirement  allowance  shall  consist  of  a
  retirement allowance which shall equal one-sixtieth of his final average
  salary multiplied by the number of years of his credited service,  which
  formula  shall  be  used  only  if  the retirement allowance so computed
  exceeds one-third  of  his  final  average  salary.  If  the  retirement
  allowance  so computed shall amount to one-third or less of the member's
  final average salary, his retirement allowance shall  be  computed  upon
  the  basis  of  the  total  service  which  he would have rendered if he
  continued in service until he  attained  age  sixty  provided  that  the
  resulting  retirement allowance computed by resort to this formula shall
  not exceed one-third of the member's final average salary.
    3. In the case of a member of the New York city employees'  retirement
  system,  the  New  York city board of education retirement system or the
  New York city teachers'  retirement  system,  his  retirement  allowance
  shall be equal to the greater of:
    (i) one-third of his final average salary; or
    (ii) one-sixtieth of his final average salary multiplied by the number
  of  years  of  his  credited service; provided, however, that where such
  member is otherwise eligible to retire for service, and  the  retirement
  allowance  which  he  would receive in the case of service retirement is
  larger than the retirement allowance he would  otherwise  receive  under
  this  subparagraph or subparagraph (i) of this paragraph, his disability
  retirement allowance pursuant to this paragraph shall be  equal  to  the
  retirement allowance he would receive if he had retired for service.
  e.  The  board  of trustees of the New York city employees' retirement
  system may, consistent with the provisions of this section, adopt  rules
  and  regulations  establishing  a  procedure  for  the medical review of
  determinations made  by  such  retirement  system  on  applications  for
  disability retirement filed pursuant to this section. Any medical review
  procedure  adopted  pursuant  to this subdivision shall be substantially
  similar to the medical review procedure provided in  section  13-169  of
  the  administrative code of the city of New York, and shall provide that
  where a request for medical review is filed on behalf  of  an  applicant
  for disability retirement, such request for medical review shall be void
  and  of  no effect unless such applicant for disability retirement, or a
  person acting on his or her behalf in accordance  with  such  rules  and
  regulations,  executes  a waiver providing that he or she waives any and
  all rights which he or she might otherwise have to seek  or  obtain  any
  other disposition of such application for disability retirement by court
  or administrative proceedings or otherwise.


§ 607-b. Performance of duty disability retirement. a. Any member of
  the  New  York  city employees' retirement system who is employed by the
  city of New York or by the New York city health and hospital corporation
  in the position of emergency medical technician  or  advanced  emergency
  medical technician, as those terms are defined in section three thousand
  one  of  the  public  health  law,  who,  on or after March seventeenth,
  nineteen   hundred   ninety-six,   becomes   physically   or    mentally
  incapacitated for the performance of duties as the natural and proximate
  result of an injury, sustained in the performance or discharge of his or
  her  duties  shall  be  paid a performance of duty disability retirement
  allowance equal to three-quarters of final average  salary,  subject  to
  the  provisions  of  subdivision  c  of section six hundred five of this
  article and section 13-176 of the administrative code of the city of New
  York. Any member who has made application or who,  after  the  effective
  date  of the chapter of the laws of two thousand four which amended this
  subdivision, makes application for  such  performance  of  duty  pension
  shall be entitled to invoke the medical review procedure provided for in
  subdivision  e of  section six hundred five of this article, subject to
  the terms and conditions set forth in such subdivision.
  b. Notwithstanding any provision of this chapter or of any general  or
  special  law  to  the  contrary,  a  member  covered by this section who
  contracts HIV (where the member may have been exposed to a bodily  fluid
  of  a  person  under  his  or her care or treatment, or while the member
  examined, transported or otherwise had contact with such person, in  the
  performance  of  his  or  her duties) tuberculosis or hepatitis, will be
  presumed to have contracted such disease in the performance or discharge
  of his or her  duties,  unless  the  contrary  be  proved  by  competent
  evidence.



Tuesday, December 8, 2009

The Transit Authority's New $22M Pension Liability

Recently, some genius at NYCERS decided to overturn a 20 year old legal interpretation of the death benefits payable to Tier 4 Transit Force members & retirees. The new interpretation creates a new annual benefit payout of approximately $22M.

The T.A. will have to pay the cost of this new benefit. On top of the on-going annual cost, the T.A. will also have to pay for the retroactive payment to the beneficiaries of every Tier 4 Transit retiree who retired after 1986 and has since died. I am sure Gary Dellaverson is thrilled but maybe, no one has given him the good news.

In 1986, the original interpretation was determined by my predecessor, Harold Herkommer, and the head of the pension division at the NYC Law Department, Jerry Dwyer. It was the correct decision. It appears in the NYCERS Tier 4 SPD (page 41) which was reviewed by the Law Department before it was published. But you better have a hard copy of that SPD because NYCERS has taken it off its web site.

A change of this magnitude should have been supported by an authoritative opinion from the Law Department and not by the fantasy of political operative at NYCERS.

Monday, November 16, 2009

Perjury at NYCERS - Trustees sleeping

November 16, 2009 - This is an update on the DOI perjury investigation of the NYCERS HR director, Felita Baksh (aka Ramsami). Listed below are letters between the NYCERS trustees and myself with respect to this investigation.

It is clear from the letters, that the trustees are ignoring this issue. I thought the November 3, 2009 election would have provided the trustees with a date for action. They are, however, still allowing this woman to put the agency at risk.

This year Baksh again lied under oath. NYCERS is currently trying to terminate a long time employee because she allegedly incorrectly claimed to have completed three cases on a weekly production report. This employee had previously reported the agency to DOI. That did not make the current executive director happy.

At a disciplinary hearing at OATH for this employee, Baksh lied about a conversation she had with the employee. Since it was a two person conversation, she felt free to deny saying what the employee claimed she had said. The employee, however, had the good sense to record the conversation unbeknownst to Baksh. There is now evidence of two instances of perjury by Baksh.

NYCERS had the nerve to threaten the employee with disciplinary charges for recording the conversation. You can’t make this stuff up. Of course, the NYCERS legal director, Mazza, was involved with the OATH hearing, so anything is possible. This was months ago and there is still no decision from OATH. That is not a good sign.

For the record, this savvy employee also has an EEO action against the agency which is moving into a trial stage. In light of my recommendation to the trustees to put Baksh on paid leave while the investigation is going on and their refusal to do so, it is disturbing that NYCERS felt it necessary to put this employee on paid leave for the last nine months along with a 30 day suspension without pay. Remember perjury is a criminal charge.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



        August 12, 2009

Greg Floyd, President – Teamsters Local 237
Trustee, NYCERS Board of Trustees
216 West 14th Street 
New York, NY 10011

        Pub. Adv. Case #: 140753

Dear Trustee:

 This is a follow up to a letter I sent to most of the trustees in March, 2009.
The original letter provided the trustees with evidence of perjury by the current NYCERS HR director, Felita Baksh.

 Only one of the trustees, the Public Advocate, took any action with respect
to this evidence. The Public Advocate forwarded the charge to the Department of
Investigation (DOI) for its review and notified me of her action. 

 As of today, I have received no notice of any subsequent action in this case.
As reference, I am enclosing a copy of a May 9, 2009 letter that I sent to DOI 
Concerning this matter. Please notify me of the status of this investigation.

 In the interim, the trustees should immediately place the HR director on
administrative leave, since this is a criminal matter and the investigators already have clear evidence of the crime (an audio tape of DOI sworn testimony)
in their possession.



        Sincerely yours,



        John J. Murphy



Cc:  Ms. Susan Edelman, NY Post

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

THE CITY OF NEW YORK OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL COUNSEL 1 CENTRE STREET. ROOM 614 NEW YORK, N.Y. 10007-2341 TELEPHONE: (212) 669-2048 FAX NUMBER: (212)815-8714 WILLIAM C. THOMPSON, JR. OMPTROLLER Lewis Finkelman DEPUTY COMPTROLLER FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS/GENERAL COUNSEL August 19, 2009 John J. Murphy Dear Mr. Murphy: I write in response to the letter that you mailed to the Comptroller on August 14ft and that was forwarded to me yesterday, regarding your allegations of perjury by Felita Baksh, a current employee of NYCERS. Your initial letter to the Comptroller in March 2009 regarding this matter was also referred to me and, at or about that time, I promptly contacted the Department of Investigation ("DOI") and forwarded your letter to that agency for its handling. Your most recent correspondence makes clear that you have referred this matter to DOI as well. Accordingly, you should follow up directly with DOI as to the status of its investigation of this matter. Very truly yours, Lewis Finkelman LF/lm

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

August 23, 2009 Mr. Lewis Finkelman Office of General Counsel Office of the Comptroller 1 Centre Street, Rm. 614 New York, NY 10007 Pub. Adv. Case #: 140753 Dear Mr. Finkelman: Thank you for your August 19, 2009 letter in which you acknowledge my March 20, 2009 letter to the Comptroller and notifying me that you had referred the reported perjury charge to DOI. The Public Advocate had already promptly notified me in an April 29, 2009 letter that she had referred this work related perjury charge against the NYCERS HR director to DOI. The Public Advocate also sent me a copy of her April 14, 2009 letter to Rose Gill Hearn. The purpose of my August 12, 2009 letter to the NYCERS trustees was to find out the status of that investigation. It would appear from your August 19, 2009 letter that you also do not know the status of that investigation. DOI has never given me any acknowledgement of this matter in spite of my Direct correspondence to Rose Gill Hearn or Richard Sullivan. The Comptroller, as a NYCERS trustee, is employing this person as the NYCERS HR director. This is while she is under investigation for perjury with respect to her official duties at NYCERS. DOI has the audio tape on which she intentionally lied under oath while being interviewed by DOI in 2004. As a NYCERS fiduciary, the Comptroller should be protecting the fund from this employee. He has hard evidence that this employee committed perjury. I strongly recommended that the trustees place this employee on administrative leave until the investigation is completed. I also request that you notify me whether you adopt this recommendation and, if you don’t, why not. DOI can not provide the trustees with protection from misdeeds by this employee while she is under investigation. The fact that DOI is possibly complicit in the perjury charge makes this action more imperative. In 1986, the trustees dealt with perjury in a rapid and ruthless manner. Why Such a casual attitude now? Sincerely yours, John J. Murphy Cc: Mr. Michael Barbaro, NY Times

Friday, November 13, 2009

Judas - Milt Aron

This story is not complete. I am sure there are a lot of pieces to this puzzle that I have not been able to find. I do know that you are reading only part of a web of corruption that is much deeper than what is written here. Updated 10/30/2013.

2001

On December 3, 2001, I promoted Milt Aron to the position of deputy executive director at NYCERS.

Subsequently, Aron became very friendly with Niki Browne. Ms. Browne was the assistant to Ms. Chiariello, the deputy director of Membership Division. In response to requests from Aron, Browne began to help Aron whenever he needed to write anything. She even wrote personnel evaluations for him of senior managers who reported to him. This included Chiariello who Browne reported to. Browne helped Aron with other special projects, in particular, the conversion of NYCERS’s massive paper file system to electronic images. (This project faltered after Aron demoted Browne in 2005.) In addition, Aron felt comfortable complaining to Browne about me. I discovered this after Aron demoted Browne in June, 2005.

In January, 2011 Ms. Browne and I were married.

2003

The following is based on sworn testimony to DOI giving by both Aron and Vibha Harish, Aron’s secretary in July, 2004 and a second sworn testimony given by Aron to DOI in October, 2004.

In or around June, 2003, Ms Harish spoke to Aron about comments that Natalia Rivera, my secretary, had made to her. Rivera had just told Ms. Harish that Ms. Browne and I were having an affair. Aron initially (July, 2004) claimed that he then spoke to Browne about the allegation and that Browne denied it.

Then in a second sworn testimony in October, 2004 Aron changed his story and claimed that the conversation with Browne occurred sometime between December, 2001 and November, 2003 when Browne had approached him to deny the relationship. The Harish conversation, however, occurred in or around June, 2003 according to both parties.

DOI never made any mention of the discrepancy in Aron’s testimony

Aron never told me about the Harish conversation. He did, however, speak to the deputy director of the Communications Division, Valarie Humphries, about possibly transferring Rivera into that unit. Aron told Humphries that Rivera was uncomfortable with a personal relationship that I was involved with.

As a follow up, Humphries was forced out of NYCERS in 2006. In a unique action, D’Alessandro, the current executive director, authorized the payment to Humphries of an undisclosed amount upon her separation. In return, Humphries signed an agreement not to make any negative comments about NYCERS. This is an illegal use of NYCERS assets.

I learned about this conversation along with other details from Humphries in 2008. I had moved to Queens in late 2007 and I meet her as she was catching a bus to work. We subsequently meet for coffee and she willing told me what she knew.

From June, 2003 on, it is clear from Aron’s comment to Humphries that Aron knew about the relationship between Browne and me. Aron never told DOI about his conversation with Humphries for obvious reasons. It is also reasonable to suspect that as of 2006, D’Alessandro knew that there were questions surrounding Aron’s decision to promote Browne in 2003.

In the summer of 2003, Aron did propose to me that we should transfer Rivera to the Communications Division to work as a technical writer but for another reason. We were both aware of Rivera’s unhappiness with her secretary’s pay and he said this would solve this problem. I offered Rivera the position in Communications and she accepted it. She, however, left NYCERS at the end of 2003.

In September, 2003, when the deputy director of administration announced that she would be retiring at the end of the year, Aron told me that he wanted to promote Ms. Browne to that position. He posted the opening internally and interviewed several NYCERS employees including Browne. He then chose Ms. Browne for the position and offered her the same salary as the incumbent. Ms. Browne’s appointment was effective January 3, 2004.

2004

In January, 2004 Martha Stark appointed Dara Ottley-Brown as assistant commissioner, real property, a high profile position at the Department of Finance. Stark was personally involved with Ottley-Brown at the time.

In June, 2004, in response to an anonymous letter to the NYCERS trustees I told the trustees that I was involved with Ms. Browne but that I had never given her any promotions or pay raises. The trustees then asked DOI to investigate the matter.

DOI then proceeded to produce one of their half assed investigations using a novice investigator, Carol DeFreitas, who actually was one of Stark’s employees.

2005

In a March 1, 2005 DOI letter to Stark, Vincent Green falsely claimed that I had promoted Ms. Browne. He then forwarded the matter (Murphy, Browne, Baksh, and Mazza) to COIB for action.

On March 10, 2005, Stark and the other NYCERS trustees took a secret vote to appoint Aron as acting executive director of NYCERS. This vote terminated my 30 year career with NYCERS. Diane Bratcher, Stark's assistant, confirmed this in her March 11, 2005 email to the Bronx Borough President’s representative. Bratcher was later caught lying about this during a 2006 deposition.

Stark was still involved with Ottley-Brown at the Department of Finance at this time. I wonder when the trustees found out about this relationship. I found out about it in August, five months later, from a Finance employee. We subsequently found out from a 2011 DOI investigation that Stark was intimately involved with other women at Finance while she was the Finance Commissioner.

On March 14, 2005, Aron becomes acting executive director of NYCERS. He meets with Stark on that day and spoke “about other staff” according to a Stark email.

Within a week, Aron fires the NYCERS security director to keep DOI happy 1. He immediately assigns the security operations to Browne while a new director is hired.

April 5, 2005

On April 5, 2005, Green at DOI sends Aron a letter recommending disciplinary action against Browne and me because of the relationship, the promotion, and for discrediting NYCERS. Green is not content with COIB action. He wants the agency to bring charges against us. Green asked Aron to look for other violations. No mention was made of the serious issues involving Mazza and Baksh.

Aron is now in a precarious spot as is a whole cast of characters. Who knows what about who and when with regards to each of the clowns in this circus. You have Baksh, Mazza, DeFreitas, Mak, Stark, Aron, Green, Bratcher, Ottley-Brown, the trustees, the Law Department, and City Hall. As time goes on the list gets longer. You can just imagine the twists and turns that they all went through. For instances, Mak has a stack of incriminating emails at his home in Pennsylvania which protects him from other parties in crime.

On the same day in response to the DOI letter, Aron calls Green. Aron tells Green that he has determined that Browne has also violated Section D, #8 of the NYCERS handbook.

”Employees shall not give false statements in connection with any NYCERS operation, activity (a timesheet) or investigation”

Aron tells Green that Browne had lied when she denied her relationship with me. Aron had never made this charge before. He has turned on Browne to protect himself.

Aron tells Green that he would wait for the COIB determination before he proceeded with charges against Browne.

Aron tells Green that he did not think he could bring charges against me because of the agreement made between the trustees and me. There was no such agreement.

When Green pressed Aron to bring charges against me because I was still on payroll, Aron said he would speak to the NYCERS Board.

Of course, charges against me were meaningless, since the trustees had already fired me but I suspect Green wanted to kill my pension. Some of my enemies thought that the trustees let me have my pension but the trustees had no say in the matter. My pension was protected by statute since I was an honorable discharged war veteran. More than you can say for most of the characters in this disaster.

From this point on, Aron had to find someone else to do his writing. Enter Karen Mazza, the woman who regularly falsifies her timesheets. That is when she has time to get of the telephone. For Aron, this was not a problem. In fact, it was an advantage in that he could take action against Mazza on a moment’s notice. Aron was well aware of Mazza's timesheet problems.

It is not clear whether, at this time, Aron knew that Felita Baksh had lied under oath to DOI, and that Mazza, Carol DeFreitas (DOI) and Kin Mak (NYCERS) had conspired to suppress incriminating evidence against Mazza and Baksh. But Aron does know there is evidence that he promoted Browne knowing that she was involved with me. He knows he could be fired for the promotion and actually lose his pension. Aron is not a veteran.

April 15, 2005

On April 15, 2005, Aron, aka Mazza, sends Green a 2 & ½ page letter in response to the DOI April 5, 2005 letter. Aron could no more write a 2 & ½ page letter than fly to the moon.

In the letter, Aron states that he agrees with the charges Green made against Browne and me. 2

Aron quotes Section II, subsection D (8) of the NYCERS handbook. He then states that Browne had at least once denied her relationship with me to him. He states that if he had known he might not have promoted her.

In fact, Aron did know about the relationship and promoted her anyway. This shines a clear light on Aron’s actions against Browne. He was protecting his own skin. Aron was aware of the relationship as of the summer of 2003. He is totally compromised. He was now willing to stab Browne in the back to save himself.

He very carefully doesn’t say when Browne denied the relationship. He knows he is on record with two different denial stories to DOI and that there is the June, 2003 conversation with Ms. Harish. Without giving a date for the denial, it is impossible to know if the denial is a false statement. Of course, there was also no mention of what the associated NYCERS operation was, which the NYCERS handbook refers to.

At this point in the letter, Aron states that he will defer disciplinary action against Browne until COIB renders its decision. As far as any action against me, Aron had no stomach for that. He again claims that the trustees and I made a deal. There was no deal. The trustees fired me.

In the final part of his letter Aron again states that he agrees with Green’s charges against Browne and me, but in an attempt to protect himself he makes some comments about the accuracy of Green’s report.3

Demotion – June 1, 2005

On May 31, 2005, COIB determines that no actions are warranted on the matters that Green had forwarded to them. (COIB# 2005-128, DOI#0406892)

On the morning of June 1, 2005, Green emails Stark about the COIB decision. There were numerous phone conversations that morning between Aron and Stark’s offices. Before lunch, Aron tells Browne that COIB has decided that no action should be taken against her. That afternoon, Aron demotes Ms. Browne to her permanent civil service position, and cuts her salary by $14,000. He also publically accuses her of lying to him before 37 NYCERS employees that day and the next.

Subsequently Browne requests a performance evaluation for the period from January 3, 2004 to June 1, 2005. Aron, true to form, has never done her performance evaluation. In a June 6, 2005 meeting Aron, with Mazza present, attempts to intimidate Browne with a libelous performance evaluation. He states that if she insists on receiving an evaluation, he will put this unsupportable attack in her file. Interestingly, in light of future claims, there was no mention in the evaluation of a future claim by Aron and Mazza that during a May 31, 2005 meeting Browne admitted to Aron and Mazza that she had lied to Aron. This "alleged" meeting occurred six days before the June 6 meeting.

D’Alessandro – October, 2005

Aron never formally applied for the permanent position of executive director. This was strange because there was not one person at NYCERS that did not know how much Aron wanted to be executive director.

In September, 2005 I notified the Law Department of Stark’s involvement with Ottley-Brown among other charges.

On October 25, 2005, the NYCERS trustees appointed Diane D’Alesandro as the new executive director effective November 7, 2005.

At the time, D’Alessandro was on the staff of Sheldon Silver. She was previously an in-house lobbyist for DC-37. She is also an openly gay woman, as is Stark. When Aron found out about the decision, he complained bitterly that D’Alessandro did not have even the minimum qualifications for the non-competitive position. It was clear to everyone that this was raw political appointment with no regard for the civil service requirements or competence.

On November 7, 2005, Aron returned to being deputy executive director.

In a November 22, 2005 affidavit, Aron claimed for the first time that in a May 31, 2005 meeting with Browne and Mazza, Browne stated she regretted that she had lied to Aron about the relationship with me.

This statement is unbelievable, especially, in relation to the date. Aron and Mazza, however, insisted under oath in 2008 that this admission occurred the day before they learned of the COIB decision or maybe May 30 or the day before that. Aron wasn’t to clear on the date but Mazza wrote it down in her date book right away. Why wasn’t this crucial information put in the notorious June 6, 2005 performance evaluation? Because Aron and Mazza dreamed it up after the fact.

Aron would have you believe that Browne volunteered, out of the blue, an admission of lying to him the exact date before he learns of the COIB decision.

There are points in this story where the audacity of corrupt people is mindboggling.

2006

As of March, 2006 Aron retires. At that time, D’Alessandro offered Aron a consulting contract with NYCERS for some work after retirement.

The trustees, however, refused to apply for a Section 211 waiver for his post-retirement work with NYCERS. Aron was, therefore, limited to making to $30,000/yr in accordance with the standard Section 212 waiver. It is strange that he did not just continue to work at NYCERS until there was no need for his help.

I guess this was his 30 pieces of silver. It’s too bad he didn’t have the decency to hang himself.

2008

In March, 2008, two years later, D’Alessandro terminates Aron’s contract. This was confirmed by internal NYCERS emails.

Aron, however, was going to be required to testify at Browne’s OATH hearing in May, 2008.

In late April, 2008 D’Alessandro reinstated Aron’s contract. As of November 1, 2009, D’Alessandro continues to pay Aron $30,000/yr for services rendered. I can just imagine her joy at continuing to have him around. They deserve each other.

As of the most recent CAFR report NYCERS paid Aron $11,900 in FY-2013. It appears that D'Allessandro finally got rid of Aron.

At the OATH hearing in May, 2008, Aron claimed that he only took time off in March and April. He was not, however, aware that there had been an internal notice at NYCERS of the termination of his contract and a revocation of his security clearance. The OATH judge chose to ignore this lie. I don’t think the judge was stupid.

Notes:

1In November, 2002 NYCERS spotted an increased number of stolen loan checks. I had the security director contact NYPD to have them investigate the problem. When the security director asked about going to DOI, I told him that my previous experience with DOI was not satisfactory. When DOI learned of NYPD’s investigation, they grabbed the case. NYPD was happy to dump the work on someone else.

Two years later, DOI finally notifies NYCERS that an employee in the NYCERS mail room was stealing loan checks. DOI had known for quite awhile about the employee. They, however, kept NYCERS in the dark and vulnerable to loss. After the employee was arrested, DOI complained about the security director’s skepticism of DOI’s work during the investigation. The security director was only following my lead with respect to DOI’s incompetence.

21) Murphy violated the NYCERS handbook when he promoted Browne (even though Aron promoted Browne),
2) Murphy and Browne violated the NYCERS Code of Conduct by having a relationship (even though there is no prohibition in the NYCERS Code of Conduct), and
3) the relationship discredited NYCERS (even though DOI was making the false charges)

3In particular, Aron claims that on numerous occasions (two) that he had told DOI under oath that Browne lied to him about her relationship with me. For the record Aron did mention that Browne denied her relationship but with two different stories. He never used the word “lied”. In addition, at the time Aron told DOI about the denial stories, he had no idea how long the relationship had existed. He therefore, had no logical basis to even make a claim that Browne lied. At the May, 2008 OATH hearing Aron gave conflicting accounts of how he learned about when the relationship started.

Because of a claim to DOI by the former internal audit director, that Browne had regularly visited my office about 30 times a week, Aron states that those 30 visits were to his office, not mine.

He also states that he had given DOI the salary histories of Browne and her predecessor in Administration and that DOI had failed to report that the salary patterns were the same. Aron was responsible for those salaries.

Aron also stated that Browne had nothing to do with Patrice Barnett’s 2004 removal as HR director since Browne had left HR in early 2001. I removed Barnett because of her unstable behavior towards her subordinates. Barnett confirmed her instability in her testimony to DOI. DOI never reported this admission or the glaring time disconnects. It is not an empty charge that DOI, at best, is incompetent.

As icing on the cake, Aron states that prior to promoting Browne as deputy director of Administration, he asked Barnett for her opinion about the promotion. Barnett said that Browne was the most qualified and that she would be able to work with Browne. Aron claims that he told DOI that fact also.

Monday, October 26, 2009

The 30 Year History of Investing at NYCERS

Over the last 30 years NYCERS has lost money in only five years. They are 2001, 2002, 2003, 2008, and 2009. Something very fundamental has gone wrong with NYCERS in the last eight years. In 2000 NYCERS was worth $43B. Today it is worth only $31B.

The mayor, however, has done very well in the last eight years. His personal wealth has gone from $4B to $16B. It's nice know that someone knows what he is doing.

It's too bad he wasn't able to be as successful as the chair of the NYCERS Board of Trustees. Eight times in the last eight years he has approved the annual authorization of Bill Thompson as the investment manager for NYCERS. He has also approved every investment decision that NYCERS trustees have made in the last eight years.

Saturday, October 24, 2009

SPD Errors - Retirement Filing Requirement and the Missing Early Retirement Option

NYCERS has recently published a new Summary Plan Description (SPD) for Tier 4 members in the 62/5 plan. Unfortunately, there are errors in the SPD. In an October 10, 2009 posting I started pointing out some of those errors. That post dealt with a error with respect to the purchase of prior service

In this posting I want to point out an error on page 34 and the failure to mention the early retirement option for 62/5 plan members.

Filing Error

The errors on page 34 involves an alleged filing requirements for service retirement under the 62/5 retirement plan. The incorrect text is listed below with the errors highlighted in bold italics:

Tier 4 members in the 62/5 Plan who are on active payroll and meet all eligibility requirements may file a service retirement application (Form #521) no earlier than 90days before, and no later than one day before, their effective retirement date.

For a Tier 4 member in the 62/5 retirement plan, there is no statutory basis for either of these two requirements stated above. The following text is the statutory language defining the eligibility requirements for the 62/5 retirement plan (Section 603 NYS RSSL):

§ 603. Eligibility for service retirement benefits; age and service requirements.

a. The service retirement benefit specified in section six hundred four of this article shall be payable to members who have met the minimum service requirements upon retirement and attainment of age sixty-two,...

The statute does not require the member to be on active payroll when filing for retirement. In fact it does not even require that the member file an application. The filing is only an administrative convenience and surely not the basis for denying a retirement benefit.

This almost exact issue was actually litigated in 1977 with a decision from the Court of Appeals in Rapp v NYCERS, 42 N.Y. 2d 1 [1977].

In that case the court held that since the statute, Section 13-151.3 of the NYC Administrative Code, did not specifically require the member to be “in city-service” when filing for retirement but only to be a member of the retirement system. The member’s retirement application, therefore, filed after the member was terminated from service, was a valid application and the member was entitled to a service retirement under Section 13-151.3.

While the legislature can obviously impose an “in active service” filing requirement, the NYCERS trustees cannot.

See Doctors council v NYCERS, 71 N.Y. 2d 669, 676 [1988].   "The NYCERS Board of Trustees surely lacks the authority to create retirement eligibility; it likewise lacks the power to disentitle employees whom the Legislature has endowed. To countenance the latter, as has been urged here by the City, would allow the agency to, in effect, amend the heart of this statute."

The end result is that a Tier 4 member in the 62/5 retirement plan (Section 604.a, NYS RSSL) can file a retirement application whether or not he/she is on an active payroll(“in active service”). It is clear that the 62/5 plan has no statutory “on active payroll” filing requirement.

In some Tier 1& 2 retirement plans (CPP & ISF) and the Tier 4 55/25 plan (but not the 57/5 plan), there are specific “active service” filing requirements for service retirements. But the 62/5 plan in Tier 4 has no such wording.

The error with regards to the filing at least one day before the effective retirement date is a minimal error but technically a member can file a retirement application on the effective date of the retirement. Without specific legislative authority NYCERS can not invalidate a properly filed application. In fact, an application can be written on a plain piece of paper and be valid.

Early Retirement Option

Strangely there is no mention in the SPD of the early retirement option for members in the 62/5 plan. This early retirement benefit was enacted in 2000 (Chapter 553) and is defined in Section 603.i.2 of the NYS RSSL. In the sane vain as Section 603.a it also has no “on active payroll” retirement application filing requirement. The relevant wording of the statute is quoted below:

i. 2. A member of the New York city employees' retirement system or the board of education retirement system of the city of New York who has met the minimum service requirement, but who is not

(a) a participant in the twenty-five-year early retirement program, ...or   (b) a participant in the age fifty-seven retirement program,...or   (c) a New York city transit authority member, ...

may retire prior to normal retirement age, but no earlier than attainment of age fifty-five, in which event,unless such person is

a member of the board of education retirement system of such city who is otherwise eligible for early service retirement pursuant to subdivision c of section six hundred four-i of this article,

the amount of his or her retirement benefit computed without optional modification shall be reduced in accordance with the following schedule:

(i) for each of the first twenty-four full months that retirement predates age sixty- two, one-half of one per centum per month; and   (ii) for each full month that retirement predates age sixty, one-quarter of one per centum per month, but in no event shall retirement be permitted prior to attainment of age fifty-five.

This means that a Tier 4 member in the 62/5 plan with at least five years of credited service can apply for benefits anytime between age 55 and 62 whether on payroll or not. There is, of course, a scaled reduction in benefits for filing before age 62.

Saturday, October 10, 2009

Errors in New SPD for Tier 4 Members in the 62/5 Plan -- Buyback of Previous Service

NYCERS has recently published a new Summary Plan Description (SPD) for Tier 4 members in the 62/5 plan. Unfortunately, there are errors in the SPD. Over several future postings I will try to point out the errors.

Specifically on page 11, dealing with the purchase of prior “New York State” service, NYCERS incorrectly states the primary requirement. The text is listed below with the error highlighted in bold italics:

PURCHASED SERVICE (BUY-BACK)

Purchased Service, commonly referred to as buy-back, is previous full-time or part-time public service rendered in the employ of a public entity anywhere in New York State that has been fully paid for and credited. Previous service will be credited to members who have rendered at least two years of Membership Service.

Generally, in order to purchase previous service, members must have been on the payroll of a public entity (not a private entity) in a position which would have allowed membership in a public employee retirement system in New York City or New York State. One benefit of purchasing previous service is the inclusion of such service as part of your Credited Service, which ultimately will enhance your retirement benefit. Another benefit is that purchasing such service may accelerate the cessation of your Basic Member Contributions (see page 6). Purchasing service does not change your membership date.

Chapter 414 of the Laws of 1983, as amended by Chapter 552 of the Laws of 2000

RSSL §609 subdivision b(1)

This is a misstatement of Chapter 552. The actual controlling text from Chapter 552 of the Laws of 2000 is quoted below with underling indicating the new word being put in the law. The full text of the Section 609 modification is listed at the end of the posting.

§ 3. Paragraph 1 of subdivision b of section 609 of the retirement and social security law, as added by chapter 414 of the laws of 1983, is amended to read as follows:

1. A member shall be eligible to obtain retirement credit hereunder for previous service with a public employer if retirement credit had previously been granted for such service or if such service which would have been creditable in one of the public retirement systems of the state, ... , at the time such service was rendered, if the individual had been a member of such retirement system

It is easy to see that NYCERS has deviated from the plain wording of Chapter 552. The effect of this error is to deny members the right under Section 609 to buyback CETA service("NYS" service from the 1970's which was financed by federal CETA funds).

The legislature could have easily used the wording

"which would have allowed membership in a public employee retirement system in New York City or New York State"

but they instead used

"which would have been creditable in one of the public retirement systems of the state, ... , at the time such service was rendered, if the individual had been a member of such retirement system"

In 2000, while I was executive director at NYCERS, I clearly instructed NYCERS staff on the correct application of Chapter 552. I wrote a memo pointing out that law stated that service was eligible if it would have been credited to a member at that time and not that the service would have made the member eligible to join a retirement system at that time. The Law Department was not happy with my proper interpretation. They knew, however, that they had no legal basis to overturn the correct interpretation. If the Law Department had a solid legal argument, they would have been obligated to overruled my position.

Obviously, now that I am no longer executive director, NYCERS feels free to overturn the correct interpretation and illegally restrict the buyback benefit. This fits into a growing pattern on NYCERS' part to illegally deny benefits to NYCERS members and retirees. See Disabled EMT Retirees. This creates an unnecessary and expensive burden on NYCERS members and retirees to defend themselves against NYCERS.

Also on page 11, NYCERS incorrectly states that a member must be on payroll in order to apply to buyback service. The following is from the SPD:

In order to purchase previous service, you must complete an Application (Form #241from you;Form 242 and/or 243 from your employer) and file it with NYCERS while you are on active payroll. You may also apply online provided that you are a MY NYCERS accountholder. If you separate from City service, you are generally not allowed to initiate a new claim to purchase previous service unless you are purchasing service to reach a threshold for vesting or disability, five years or ten years, respectively.

Nowhere in Section 609 is it stated that a member must be on active payroll to apply to purchase service. The only requirement is that he/she be a member when he/she files.

In 1988, the Court of Appeals in Doctors Council v. NYCERS clearly stated that:

"The NYCERS Board of Trusrees surely lacks the authority to create retirement eligibility; it likewise lacks the power to disentitle employees whom the legislature has endowed. To countenance the latter, as has been urged by the City, would allow the agency to, in effect, amend the heart of this statute."

The trustees have no plain language authorization to restrict filing eligibility to only members on active payroll. There is no such authorization in Section 609. If there was, you can be sure that NYCERS would have quoted it.

In addition, NYCERS' attempt to carve out exceptions to this unauthorized filing restriction completely underscores the lack of statutory authority to restrict a member's right to purchase prior "NYS" service under Section 609.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The full text of the Section 609 modification in Chapter 552 of the Laws of 209

§ 3. Paragraph 1 of subdivision b of section 609 of the retirement and social security law, as added by chapter 414 of the laws of 1983, is amended to read as follows:

1. A member shall be eligible to obtain retirement credit hereunder for previous service with a public employer if retirement credit had previously been granted for such service or if such service which would have been creditable in one of the public retirement systems of the state, as defined in subdivision twenty-three of section five hundred one of this chapter, at the time such service was rendered, if the individual had been a member of such retirement system and the member has rendered a minimum of [five] two years of credited service after July first, nineteen hundred seventy-six or after last rejoining a public retirement system, if later; provided, however, retirement credit may be granted for service which predates the date of entry into the retirement system if such service is otherwise creditable and the member satisfied the minimum service requirements set forth in this subdivision[: and

(a) Was rendered by an employee during which employment he became a member of the retirement system; or

(b) Was] and was rendered by an employee of a public employer during which employment he was ineligible to join a public retirement system provided that such public employer was participating in a public retirement system of the state at the time of such employment, or is so participating at the time that such credit for such previous service is being sought.

Friday, October 2, 2009

Line-of-duty EMS retirees and outside work

Congratulations to Line-of Duty EMS retirees on the passage of Chapter 461 of the Laws of 2009. This new law will allow these retirees to work without the “gainful employment” prohibition threatening their line-of-duty disability pensions.

In 2008, NYCERS mistakenly began to apply the 1983 gainful employment restriction to the 1998 EMS line-of duty disability benefit. This restriction applies only to regular Tier 4 disability benefits. Because of this error, the EMS Retirees Association brought an Article 78 proceeding against NYCERS. The result was a stipulation where the parties agreed 1) to pursue a change in the law and 2) in the interim, a moratorium on the restriction until October 1, 2010.

The new law removes any possibility of confusion by NYCERS about the clear intent of the original disability benefit for these retirees. It is now absolutely clear that these retirees have no earnings limitations for work after retirement.

Thursday, August 13, 2009

The Email Superman

For all you IT pros, this should be a funny story.

Quoted below is an excerpt from an affidavit submitted by Kin Mak on June 19, 2007.

Mazza was under investigation by DOI (DeFreitas) for improperly influencing the hiring of Baksh as NYCERS HR director with respect to both Baksh’s resume and possibly Baksh’s second writing sample. Mazza had told DeFreitas that she had previously deleted all her relevant emails to Baksh. DeFreitas had asked Mak to search for Mazza’s deleted emails. For some reason DeFreitas allowed Mazza to participate in the alleged search for the deleted emails.

Here is the quote:

3. My search for the e-mails requested by Ms. DeFreitas was structured as follows.
First, the time period for the search was January 2004 through July 27, 2004, the date of the DeFreitas request.
Second, I searched for two types of e-mails:
(1) e-mails in Ms. Mazza’s e-mail box in which Ms Mazza was either the sender or the recipient and “resume” was the subject of the e-mail: and
(2) e-mails in Ms. Mazza’s e-mail box in which Felita Baksh, was either the sender or recipient at the e-mail address of bakshf@fdny.nyc.gov., and which either had “resume” in the subject field or the substance of the email concerned Ms. Baksh’s resume.
I conducted the search for the above e-mails by:
a) searching Ms. Mazza’s then-current e-mail box, i.e., the e-mail box as it existed on July 27, 2004; and
b) searching the weekly backup tapes starting from July 27, 2004, and going back to January 2004.

4. As result of the above search, I was able to recover one e-mail, dated January 28, 2004, in which the original sender was Felita Baksh at bakshf@fdny.nyc.gov, the subject was “Resume” and which had been sent by Ms. Baksh to Niki Browne NYCERS, who forwarded it to Ms. Mazza. On July 27, 2004, I forwarded the recovered e-mail to Ms. DeFreitas. A copy of an e-mail from me to Ms. DeFreitas, dated July 27, 2004, containing the recovered e-mail, is annexed hereto as Exhibit “B”.

This alleged search occurred sometime between 7:17 AM and 10:22 AM on July 27, 2004. As per instructions from DeFreitas and Mak’s comment in his 7:17 AM email, Mak spoke to Ms. Mazza before going ahead with the email search. For all of you who know Mazza’s morning arrival record at NYCERS, you will conclude that Mak did not start his search promptly at 7:17 AM. By 10:22 AM on the 27th, Mak emailed DeFreitas the results of his search, the one email mentioned above.

To anyone who is not familiar with the logistics of Microsoft’s Outlook, Mak’s description of this alleged search appears to be unremarkable. It is, however, the equivalent of someone describing a one mile run that took only 5 seconds. This was a patently false affidavit. The Law Department was made aware of the obvious lies in the affidavit but chose to bury the inconvenient truth. It’s not cheating, if you don’t get caught.

While it was very easy to search the current email box, the alleged searching of the 27 backup tapes would have been an enormously time consuming project. The tapes are not directly accessible and have to be downloaded to perform the search that Mak described. It usually takes over an hour for NYCERS to perform the daily backup of its Outlook system. The backup process is relatively simple compared to the restore process. I will spare you the complexities of restoring Outlook especially when there is already an active production Outlook system running. It is almost metaphysically certain that Mak did not search any of the backup tapes. Of course, there is no paper documentation of this search on the morning of July 27, 2004.

The affidavit was notarized by, guess who, Karen Mazza.

Subsequent to this affidavit Mak had to clarify that the famous one email was actually found in Niki Browne’s current email box and not in any of Mazza’s email boxes. At least that was what Mak said. Why was he looking Ms. Browne's email file?

Shake Hands with the Devil

In early 2000 at the height of the dot-com bubble, the former mayor agreed to major improvements in the pension benefits for city workers. At the same time, the trustees of the five city pension funds agreed to a “market restart” of the assets of the city’s five pension funds as recommended by the NYCERS & TRS actuary. This allowed the city to drastically cut its pension contributions in 2000.

But almost immediately, the devil came knocking on the door. After steadily advancing for ten years, the market perversely began to collapse and did not recover until 2003. See note below.

In the summer of 2002, it was clear to informed experts that the five city pension funds were headed in the wrong direction and that they needed to make serious changes to the systems. They, first, had to put in place a lower benefit structure for new employees. Second, they had to significantly increase employer contributions. Third, they had to put in place an investment strategy that would minimize risk, steadily grow the assets of the funds and produce an adequate and reliable income stream. For various reasons they did none of these things.

Then in 2007, the mortgage crisis hit and the devil was back with a vengeance. When the markets closed on June 30, 2009, the city pension funds had approximately $82B in assets, $19B less than they had 10 years ago. The rate of inflation over the last ten years makes this loss even worse than it first appears.

Over the same ten years, the pension funds have fallen short of their expected rate of return by $53B. The actuary’s 8% target has turned out to be beyond the reach of the trustees. Perversely, it also caused the trustees to adopt a very aggressive investment strategy.

Since the City Charter revision in 1989, the mayor has become the dominant political figure in the city. As such, his representatives on the pension boards wield tremendous power. It is unfortunate that his former choice for the NYCERS and TRS chairperson brought no expertise to this position. In FY-2009, the trustees of the five pension funds blindly spent $400M on investment fees while the funds lost $19B in assets.

It is ironic that in the midst of theses losses NYCERS earns a guaranteed 7% rate of return on loans to NYCERS members.

While the assets have been shrinking, the benefits have been exploding. In 2009, the five pension funds will pay out $9.9B. This is an 80% increase from the $5.5B pay out in 2000.

The city’s budgeted pension contribution for 2010 is $6.4B (with a phantom $200M projected savings). That is 17.5% of the total city payroll. While this amount is obscenely out of proportion to the payroll, it is significantly short of what is needed to properly fund the current pension benefits. In fact, the city’s contribution to the FDNY pension fund is $874M, well over 80% of the firefighters’ payroll. In FY-2008, however, this retirement system was only 56% funded.

In addition to the city’s contributions, the city’s 240,000 workers will be required to contribute over $755M to the pension funds in 2010.

On July 1, 2009, the governor signed the extension bill for Tier 3 &4. Because of his previous veto of the police & fire Tier 2 extension bill, all new police officers and firefighters are in Tier 3. While this 33 year old law has never been analyzed for police & fire benefits, it is reasonable to assume these benefits are less costly than the Tier 2 benefits.

This sets the stage for a rewrite of pension benefits for all new NYS employees. While employees are entitled to decent retirement benefits, employees will be at risk, if those benefits are not sustainable.

If new employees benefits are reduced, then future investment policy must be based on a conservative, highly transparent strategy with minimal management costs.

In addition, there can be no campaign contributions allowed at any time from any firm or their employees & spouses, who have contracts with the pension firms, to any person who makes decisions effecting those contracts. Without this change, the investment process will continue to rot.

Also as part of the reform, there is a need for a mandatory minimum/maximum contribution by the city and participating employers. If the employees are required to pay 3% of their pay checks, then the city should always pay at least 6% and cap its upper liability at 10% for new employees and new benefits. This would be a big incentive to keep the investment strategy conservative and not let the benefit structure get out of hand.

Funding a pension system is a simple process and if done with integrity, almost never fails. If you consistently contribute 12% of income to a fund and invest the money wisely, in 30 years with a 6% percent rate of return, you have a 50% pension at age 62. Why do some many pension funds fail? Without effective oversight, people tend to stray. It is telling that the NY State Insurance Department has not issued an audit of any of the city pension funds since 1999. On June 25, 2009 the Insurance Department finally issued the audit for NYCERS covering FY-2000 to FY-2002. Better late than never.

There is now a real danger to the pension benefits of city workers and retirees. Underfunding, bad investment decisions, and excessive benefits are the death kneel for a pension fund.

Note: From 1989 to 1999, the NYCERS assets rose from $16.5B to $41.0B. From 1999 to 2009, those same assets fell from $41.0B to $29.8B and the funded status has dropped from 136%. to 80%.

Wednesday, July 29, 2009

GASB Statement #50

In May, 2007, the Government Accounting Standards Board, GASB, issued Statement No. 50. Its purpose was to standardize the reporting of the funded status of public pension plans throughout the country. This directive went into effect for the five city pension funds with the financial reporting for the year ending June 30, 2008.

This reporting requirement led to the inclusion of a new table on page 101 in the city’s FY-2008 comprehensive annual financial report, CAFR. This table uses a more standard generally accepted actuarial cost method than the statutory method used by the city pension funds.

These two different methods paint very different pictures of the funded status of the city pension funds. With the new standard method, the funded status of NYCERS has fallen from 136% in 1999 to 80% in 2009. In simple terms, this means that NYCERS has $8 for every $10 it owes. The statutory method reports that for 2009 NYCERS is 100% funded. The NYCERS actuary, however, concedes that the numbers produced using the statutory method “provide limited insight into the ongoing financial performance of the Plan”.

There is no comment by the actuary in either the city or the NYCERS CAFR report about the impact of the standard funded status. The information is clearly stated in the financial report but is completely ignored, at least publicly.

The situation is even worse in the other four city pension funds as indicated on page 101 of the FY-2008 city CAFR. (TRS: 71.8%, BERS: 73.2%, Police: 69.5%)

The funding status at the FDNY pension fund is even more alarming. The standard method indicates a 55.8% funded status for FY-2008 with a benefit payout of $915M based on a payroll of $1B, and a closing balance for the year of $7.2B. The city is making enormous contributions as you can see below and the actuary has only begun to reflect the recent market losses in these costs.

Fiscal YearCity Contribution to FDNY pension fund
2008$780M
2009$844M
2010$874M

Thursday, July 16, 2009

More Details on the Perjury Story

At the end of June I posted a story about perjury by the HR director at NYCERS and the involvement of the legal director at NYCERS and the investigator at DOI. The following is a portion of deposition given by the NYCERS legal director, Karen Mazza, in November, 2006. She earns approximately $162,000/yr. The testimony deals directly with her involvement with these apparently improper activities surrounding the perjury.

Just a reminder. When someone answers that he/she can not remember, there is the possibility that he/she is withholding information in a way that does not perjure him/herself. It is the classic sign of a non-cooperating witness.

Portions of the Mazza Deposition from November 21, 2006

Page 59

Q.: Do you have any current recollection that you advised the DOI investigators that you had deleted the Baksh revision E-mails?

A. No, I don't have any recollection.

Q. We have had marked as Exhibit 23 to the DeFreitas deposition 0745, a summary of a conversation in which it appears that you advised DOI on that date, July 22, 2004, that you had deleted the Baksh resume E-mails. Do you see that?

A. Yes.

Q. Does this refresh your recollection that your first statement to DOI about revising the Baksh resumes was subsequent to your testimony on July 13, 2004?

MR. MARKS: Objection to the form. You mean about deleting E-mails? Have your question read back. MS. CARROLL: Read it back. (Record read.)

Q. You have looked at Exhibit 23?

A. Yes.

Q. It is a fact, is it not, that July 22, 2004 is the first time you tell DOI that you (Page 60) deleted the Baksh resumes that indicate your actions with respect to that resume?

MR. MARKS: The E-mails. MS. CARROLL: Yes.

A. Yes.

Q. You never mention the E-mail deletion prior to July 22, 2004 to DOI, right?

A. No.

Q. That is correct?

A. That is correct.

MS. CARROLL: Mark this E-mail dated 7/29/04 as Mazza Exhibit 3. (Mazza Exhibit 3, E-mail dated 7/29/04, marked for identification, as of this date.)

Q. I will direct your attention to the upper part of the memo. What do you mean you're uncomfortable if anybody in-house asks to see your deleted E-mails; uncomfortable about what?

A. I wanted to know if anybody else was asking to look at those deleted E-mails.

Q. That wasn't my question. I understand that. That is what it says. My question to you is, why were you uncomfortable about this Page 61 information being recoverable, the deleted E-mails?

MR. MARKS: Objection to the form.

A. I wasn't uncomfortable with it being recoverable. I was uncomfortable with other people asking to see it.

Q. I am reading what you wrote. "I am somewhat uncomfortable with this info being recoverable." That is not my words. That is what it says here. My question is, when you wrote this, why did you say that? What were you uncomfortable with about having this information, that is the deleted E-mails, being recoverable?

MR. MARKS: Objection to the form.

A. That is not -- what I wrote is not what I meant. When I say recoverable, I meant being seen by somebody else.

Q. Well, you couldn't see it if it wasn't recovered.

A. Right.

Q. Why were you uncomfortable that the E-mails that you had deleted would be seen by somebody else "in-house"? Why? Page 62

A. My purpose in writing that paragraph was, we were in the middle of a DOI investigation and I wanted to know if anybody else was asking Kin to show them my deleted E-mails.

Q. You're not answering my question. I asked you, using your own words, why were you uncomfortable with this information being recoverable. I am asking you why.

A. I answered you and said that –

Q. No, you haven't answered me. Why were you uncomfortable; because it would show that you doctored a resume?

A. No.

Q. Why were you uncomfortable; because you deleted E-mails and it related to a subject that you were sitting on a panel?

A. What I said to you in my answer previously was that what I wrote is not what I meant.

Q. You're a lawyer, Ms. Mazza. The trade of a lawyer is the usage of words. I want to know, what did you mean when you used the words, I am somewhat uncomfortable with this information being recoverable? At that time, what did you Page 63 mean?

MR. MARKS: Objection to the form.

Q. What did you mean?

A. What I meant was, I want to know if Mr. Murphy was asking to see my deleted E-mails. That is what I meant.

Q. Did you tell DeFreitas or Kin Mak or anybody that you were concerned that Mr. Murphy would see your deleted E-mails?

A. No.

Q. Why Mr. Murphy?

A. Because we were in the middle of a DOI investigation.

Q. Why shouldn't DOI get the deleted E-mails regarding the allegation that you doctored the Baksh resume?

A. I didn't say DOI shouldn't get the E-mails.

Q. Well, they couldn't get them because you deleted them, right?

MR. MARKS: Objection to the form.

Q. Isn't that right; DOI couldn't get the E-mails regarding the Baksh resume because you deleted them, right? Page 64

A. Correct.

Q. There was an effort to try to retrieve the deleted E-mails, isn't that right? DOI was trying to retrieve them?

A. Yes.

Q. In fact, your testimony that there was no back-up tapes, that is incorrect; isn't that right?

MR. MARKS: Objection to the form.

A. There are back-up tapes but only for a certain amount of time.

Q. The statement that there were no back-up tapes is inaccurate?

MR. MARKS: That is not what she testified to. You asked whether she testified there were back-up tapes on which the E-mail tapes would be on, not whether the agency has any back-up tapes, period. MS. CARROLL: We will go back over it.

Q. At or about the time that the inquiry was being made by DOI, there were back-up tapes for E-mails; isn't that right?

A. Yes.

Q. In fact, there were back-up tapes for Page 65 E-mails going back a year; isn't that right?

A. That, I don't know.

Q. Then you can't give testimony that there weren't, right? There is a difference between if you know a thing or you're guessing. In 2004, whether or not there were back-up tapes for the E-mails you deleted, your testimony is that you don't know, right?

MR. MARKS: Objection to the form.

A. I know there were not because when they tried to find them, they couldn't find them.

Q. How do you know that? How do you know that they couldn't find them?

A. Because I was told by DOI.

Q. Who told you in DOI that Kin Mak could not get back-up tapes for your deleted E-mails?

A. I don't remember.

Q. Did you have contact with somebody other than DeFreitas during the course of the investigation of the allegation against you regarding the revision of the Baksh resume?

A. There was Alberta Ancrum also working on that case.

Q. Anybody else? Page 66

A. Vinnie Green was also working on the case.

Q. Did you have conversation with any of those people, Ancrum, Green or DeFreitas, regarding the matter of whether there were back-up tapes for the deleted E-mails?

A. Someone from DOI told me they could not recover the E-mails.

Q. They told you this verbally or in an E-mail?

A. I believe it was verbally.

Q. You're the subject of one of the allegations, right?

A. Yes.

Q. Your testimony is that you deleted E-mails regarding the revision of the Baksh resume, right?

A. Yes.

Q. You're telling me that with respect to the issue of whether there were back-up tapes which would produce the E-mails that documented what, in fact, you did, DOI tells you, the subject, that the back-up tapes don't exist?

A. Yes. Page 67

Q. Did DOI also tell you whoever it was of these three, Ancrum, Green or DeFreitas, that they couldn't obtain the deleted E-mails from the fire department E-mail system?

A. No.

MR. MARKS: I will let you go on with this questioning -- MS. CARROLL: We are getting to it -- MR. MARKS: This is a case brought by Mr. Murphy concerning defamation. MS. CARROLL: This is very much into the legally being a reckless disregard for the truth.

Q. Why were you concerned that Mr. Murphy would have access to the deleted E-mails if the back-up was discovered, the back-up files?

A. I was just concerned.

Q. It is a fact, is it not, that you at no time during the interview process for HR director told Mr. Murphy that you had revised Baksh's resume?

A. I didn't tell Mr. Murphy that I had been asked to look at Felita's suggestions for --

Q. You tracked things and moved things Page 68 around, right?

MR. MARKS: Objection to the form.

A. I didn't move things around. I made suggestions about what --

Q. -- for moving things around.

A. Correct.

Q. When you testified at DOI, you testified that you didn't know whether or not Baksh had, in fact, adopted your suggestions; isn't that right?

A. Yes.

Q. But, in fact, you had as a member of the panel the Baksh resume that she submitted for the position, right?

A. Yes.

Q. By reference to the E-mails that you had which included the original resume and the resume that she submitted to the panel, you in fact uniquely did have access to the information that would answer that question?

MR. MARKS: Objection to form.

A. If I still had the E-mail in my E-mail box.

Q. There is no question, Ms. Mazza, that Page 69 as of the time of the interview which was only a brief period after you received the E-mail from Browne that you still had the Baksh-related E-mails, right? Isn't that right?

A. I may have.

Q. The date of Exhibit 22 to the DeFreitas deposition is dated January 28, 2004. This is from Baksh to Browne which gets forwarded to you, right?

A. Yes.

Q. This E-mail existed at the time that Baksh was, in fact, interviewed, isn't that correct? You didn't delete the E-mails between January of 2004 and the date of the interviews?

A. I don't know when I deleted the E-mails.

Q. You have no recollection that it postdated the actual interview by Baksh?

A. I don't know when I deleted the E-mails.

Q. Did you talk to the NYCERS trustees or anybody else at NYCERS about these tapes, the back-up tapes for the E-mails?

A. No. Page 70

Q. You said Jodi Nagel resigned. Was she on maternity leave?

A. Yes.

Q. Did she have to resign because she was on maternity leave?

A. It was just something Ms. Nagel, now Mrs. Rodman, decided to stay home and be a stay-at-home mom.

Q. Subsequent to your interview at DOI, did you have any contact with any of the trustees regarding the investigation? And I include Bratcher in this question.

A. I don't remember.

Q. Did you speak with Ms. Stark regarding the matter?

A. I don't remember.

Q. Did you send any E-mails to anyone additional to DeFreitas regarding the investigation of the allegations in the anonymous letter?

A. I don't remember.

Q. In addition to the E-mails concerning the Baksh resume, did you delete other E-mails?

A. I am sorry. Say that again. Page 71

MS. CARROLL: Read it back. (Record read.)

A. Oh, yes.

Q. Did you ever speak with Musaraca subsequent to the time that you testified at DOI?

A. I speak to Mr. Musaraca frequently.

Q. That is a silly question. Sorry. Prior to the DOI report coming out and subsequent to your testimony, did you speak to Musaraca?

A. Mr. Musaraca, yes. He is one of my trustees.

Q. Did you speak to him about the investigation of the anonymous letter at any time between July 13, 2004 and March 1, 2005 when the DOI report came out?

A. I don't remember.

Q. Did you ever have any conversation with him about the allegations against you subsequent to testifying and prior to the DOI report?

A. I really don't remember.

Q. What about E-mails?

A. I really don't remember.

Q. Would you have your E-mails from that Page 72 period?

A. No.

Q. You destroyed all the E-mails?

MR. MARKS: Objection.

A. Yes.

Q. Is there any back-up name for them?

A. I don't know.

Q. When did you first see the DOI report on the allegations raised in the June 1 anonymous letter?

A. The day of the trustees meeting.

Q. At the trustees meeting?

A. No.

Q. What were the circumstances?

A. A copy of it was left in my office.

Q. By whom?

A. I have no idea.

Q. When?

A. The morning of the trustees meeting.

Q. Prior to the meeting?

A. Yes.

Q. Without any indication as to who left it there?

A. It was on my chair. Page 73

Q. I want to make sure I have this exactly correct. On March 1, 2005, there is a DOI report. The records in this case indicate that there was a meeting on March 10, 2005 on that report. It is your testimony that on the morning of March 10, 2005, there is a copy of the DOI report on your chair?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you have any conversation with any of the trustees prior to March 10, 2005 regarding the fact that that there was a DOI report?

A. I don't remember.

Q. When you saw this DOI report on your chair on March 10, did you know prior to that that there had been a determination by DOI?

A. I think so.

Q. How did you first find out there was a DOI determination on the allegations raised in the June 1 anonymous letter?

A. I know I spoke to Vinnie Green that week, in that time period. He told me they were coming out with a report, but I don't remember when it was. Page 74

Q. Did he tell you what the conclusion was?

A. He told me they were referring the allegation regarding me to COIB.

Q. Vinnie Green is Vincent Green?

A. Yes.

Q. He called you or you called him?

A. He called me.

Q. You were a subject of the investigation. Why was he speaking to you?

MR. MARKS: Objection to the form.

Q. Before the report was issued.

A. I don't know.

Q. Do you have a personal relationship with him?

A. No.

Q. Well, you're a subject. He is investigating you. Why did he tell you he was calling you about it?

MR. MARKS: Objection to the form.

A. I don't know why he called me.

Q. Did he tell you that there were Page 75 findings against Mr. Murphy in this conversation?

A. No.

Q. Was it one phone call or more?

A. One.

Q. When you got this phone call, what did you do with that information?

A. Nothing.

Q. You didn't tell Mr. Murphy?

A. No.

Q. Did you speak to any of the trustees about this?

A. No.

Q. Prior to the meeting on March 10, 2005 in which the DOI findings are discussed, you know there is a letter. You know that they are referring your part to COIB and you have no conversation with any trustees; is that right?

A. I don't -- no, I don't.

Q. Not with Bratcher, not with Stark?

A. No.

MS. CARROLL: Let's take a break.

(Recess taken.)

Q. On the date of the March 10, 2005 trustees meeting which considers, among other…

Friday, July 10, 2009

The 8% Delusion

The governor is ready to sign a bill (A8933/S5918) sponsored by the city to extend for one year the 8% actuarial assumed rate of return for the assets of the city pension funds. This rate of return controls the size of the city's annual pension costs. It is so important that it requires legislation. It is not left up to the discretion of the actuary or the pension board trustees.

Maintaining the 8% rate of return is crucial to the city's budget. If the 8% were lowered to 7 or 6%, the required contribution would radically increase. Even with the 8% rate, the employer’s contributions for the five city pension funds in FY-2010 are $7.6B. In the city's case, it is paying $6.4B or 17.5% of its totally payroll.

Once upon a time in the 1990’s, 8% was a realistic target but not since 2000 has anyone been able maintain an 8% trend. Over the last ten years, the actual rate of return for the five city pension funds has averaged only 2.4%. The pension funds have missed their rate of return target by $53B during this period. This figure, however, is only the sum of the shortfalls for each year. It doesn't capture the significant effect of annual compounding.

As an example, since 2000 NYCERS has missed its 8% target by $24B. If it had achieved 8%, NYCERS would have a closing balance of $63B as of June 30, 2009. Instead, it has closing balance of $29.8B, $33B less than the $63B. The additional $9B shortage beyond the $24B is the result of annual compounding.

In addition to the obvious underfunding that the 8% target rate has produced, it has also had a nasty impact on the investment strategy pursued by the pension funds. Because the 8% target was a high threshold, the actuary for the pension funds advised the trustees of the funds that a conservative investment plan would never support the 8%.

A conservative strategy is something along the line of a 50/50 split between domestic stocks and high grade government/corporate bonds. While this is conservative for a mature pension fund, it still has a significant level of risk. In the current market, the city pension funds might still have lost significant assets.

In the NYCERS fund, the trustees have 46% of the assets in domestic stocks, 28% in higher risk investments, and only 29% in high grade bonds. NYCERS lost $9B in FY-2009. The conservative strategy could have possibly reduced that loss to $6B for the year.

The 8% rate has caused both underfunding and higher investment losses. The pension funds must become more transparent, if they are to survive. There is too much closed door arm twisting going on.

Tuesday, July 7, 2009

NYCERS Assets as of June 30, 2009

As of June 30, 2009 the S&P 500 index closed at 919.32. This was a significant increase from the March 31, 2009 close of 797.87. A reasonable estimate of the closing balance of NYCERS assets as of June 30, 2009 is $29.79B up from $28.09B on March 31, 2009. In spite of this $1.7B increase for the 4th quarter, the loss for the full year was still a devastating $9.07B.

The $29.79B balance includes a $1.9B private equity component and $1.1B real estate component. These items are not set at a market value but at an amount equal to the money that was originally invested. There is not reflection of profit or loss in these values. NYCERS has no policy for reporting these investments at their true value.

NYCERS uses the Pacific Corporate Group as its investment consultant for private equity investments. As reported in a recent WSJ article Pacific Corporate Group entered into settlement with the NYS Attorney General Office with respect to investment allegations. It is not clear how the NYCERS trustees are going to respond to this agreement.

The following is a table of NYCERS Assets and Benefits for the last ten years. It is clear that assets are trending down and benefits are trending up. This is not sustainable.

YearAssetsBenefits &
Expenses
2000$42.8B$2.54B
2001$38.1B$2.78B
2002$32.8B$2.57B
2003$31.5B$2.89B
2004$34.1B$2.80B
2005$35.5B$2.92B
2006$37.2B$3.06B
2007$42.5B$3.34B
2008$39.7B$3.22B
2009$29.8B$3.45B

Friday, June 26, 2009

Department of Investigation and Perjury at NYCERS

In a June 5, 2009 posting, I described an act of perjury committed by the current HR director at NYCERS, Felita Baksh, aka Ramsami. The following is a further description of the involvement of three other people with that perjury, one of which was functioning as an investigator for the Department of Investigation (DOI).

DOI is as subject to corruption as any other human organization. In addition, there is no oversight agency with authority to monitor DOI. The Commissioner of DOI serves at the pleasure of the mayor. The mayor can replace her without cause at a moment's notice. It is hard to imagine DOI producing an investigative report that would embarrass the mayor.

In December, 2003 Martha Stark assigned Carol DeFreitas, a Finance Department employee, to work on loan as an investigator with Vincent Green at DOI. For several years, DeFreitas remained on the Finance payroll while continuing to work at DOI. She is now on the DOI payroll with an annual salary of $83,000. DeFreitas is the investigator who suppressed the evidence of Baksh’s perjury.

The following is a July, 2004 time line covering the three people involved with Baksh’s perjury and other possible criminal acts.

  1. On July 13, 2004 DeFreitas interviewed Karen Mazza. Under oath, Mazza admitted to editing Baksh's resume. She further admitted to using email to send the resume to Baksh.
  2. On July 16, 2004, DeFreitas sent an email to NYCERS LAN administrator, Kin Mak, asking whether he could recover deleted emails from approximately 2 months ago.
  3. On July 23, 2004 DeFreitas makes note of phone conversation with Mazza in which Mazza claims to have deleted emails to Baksh about 2 & 1/2 months ago. DeFreitas tells Mazza that the LAN group may be able to retrieve the email and that she will ask them to do that.
  4. In a July 26, 2004 (5:05PM) email DeFreitas requests that Kin Mak give her copies of Mazza’s deleted emails as follows:
    Hello again Kin: I hope you enjoyed your vacation. I'm hoping you could retrieve e-mail(s) deleted by Karen Mazza about 2 and a half months ago. The subject of the email(s) was “resume” and the original sender was Felita Baksh. There may actually be several of these mails on the same topic going back and forth. I've spoken to Karen about this; so if you need additional information to help you in your search, please feel free to contact Karen and please keep this confidential. thank you. Carol.
  5. The following morning, July 27, 2004(7:17AM) Mak emailed DeFreitas as follows:
    Thanks. Mondays are usually my scheduled day off (4 days work week). I will call you this morning to verbally confirm going ahead with the email retrieval. Also I will speak to Karen regarding this matter. Regards,
  6. Three hours later (10:22 AM) Mak sent the following email to DeFreitas:
    Hi Carol: I am forwarding you the email I was able to recover. Please let me know if you need further assistance. Regards,
  7. On July 29, 2004 (10:25AM) Mazza sent the following email to DeFreitas:
    "...Also can you please ask Kin Mak to let you know if anyone in house asks to see my deleted emails? I am somewhat uncomfortable with this info being recoverable. I'm sure you can understand why."

DeFreitas’ behavior during this time is very suspicious. She was looking to retrieve evidence that could be very damaging to a target of an investigation. She then allowed the target to control the search for the evidence. She also suspected that there were several emails. This might indicate other assistance that Mazza may have given Baksh. There were allegations about Baksh’s final writing test. The test was the basis on which she was hired. Of course, the actual emails would have clarified the situation.

When Mak retrieved only one email, DeFreitas made no attempt to check into the email system at the Fire Department where Baksh worked before returning to NYCERS. In fact Baksh’s Fire Department email address was on the one email that Mak allegedly retrieved. DeFreitas took no action in response to the admission by Mazza that Mazza did not want any NYCERS staff seeing her deleted emails. Mazza clearly knew that they are recoverable from the backup tapes. DeFreitas obviously knew this too. The existence of the deleted emails is further confirmed below.

In an affidavit, notarized by Mazza on June 19, 2007, Mak gives the details of this email search on the morning of July 27, 2004. The relevant testimony is as follows:

3. My search for the emails requested by Ms. DeFreitas was structured as follows. First, the period for the search was January 2004 through July 27, 2004, the date of Ms DeFreitas' request. Second, I searched for two types of emails: (1) e-mails in Ms. Mazza's e-mail box in which Ms. Mazza was either the sender or the recipient and "resume" was the subject of the e-mail; and (2) e-mails in Ms Mazza's e-mail box in which Felita Baksh, was either the sender or recipient at the e-mail address of bakshf@fdny.nyc.gov, and which either had “resume” in the subject field or the substance of the e-mail concerned Ms. Baksh's resume. I conducted the search for the above e-mails by: (a) searching Ms. Mazza's then current e-mail box, i.e., the email box as it existed on July 27, 2004; and (b) searching the weekly backup tapes starting from July 27, 2004, and going backward to January 2004. 4. As a result of the above search, I was able to recover one e-mail, dated January 28, 2004, in which the original sender was Felita Baksh at bakshf@fdny.nyc.gov, the subject of which was "Resume" and which had been sent by Ms. Baksh to Niki Browne NYCERS, who forwarded it to Ms. Mazza. On July 27, 2004, I forwarded the recovered e-mail to Ms. DeFreitas.

It is clear that Mak would have you believe that he was able to find only one of Mazza's allegedly deleted emails. However, shortly after this affidavit Mak was forced to admit that he did not find this email in Mazza's email box on line or on the backup tapes. He had to admit that he actually found it in the active email box of Niki Browne who had forwarded it to Mazza and who had no reason to delete it.

While this means that Mak made a false statement in his affidavit, the truly bizarre fact about Mak's description of his e-mail search is that it is a total fabrication and a physical impossibility.

Each backup tape would have taken at least two hours to search, assuming no problems, and he claims to have searched 27 backup tapes. It is clearly impossible to have searched 27 backup tapes in three hours. It would have taken him at least 54 straight hours to perform the search. Just putting your hands on 27 tapes in three hours would have been a miracle, never mind down loading them and searching them for specific info. Mak never provided any documentation verifying the search.

During a subsequent deposition, Kin Mak, under advice of counsel, refused to answer any questions about the search. The deposition was ordered because Mak told Niki Browne that he had found many incriminating e-mails and that Mazza, DeFreitas, and Baksh were all dirty. This occurred on October 12, 2006 at NYCERS and in the phone calls later that evening and during the next three days. During the deposition, Mak attempted to deny having had these phone conversations but when presented with phone records, he changed his testimony.

What do we have now? For the last five years the city has been paying four city officials who are most likely guilty of criminal acts involving their official duties. DOI is facing the serious possibility of a corrupt investigator who suppressed evidence of perjury and conspired with a target to hide evidence during an investigation. NYCERS has three corrupt employees, a HR director who is perjurer, a legal director who hides evidence and lures another employee into making false statements, and a senior IT manager who allowed himself to be drawn into a conspiracy and then forced to commit perjury.

It is actually perverse that Mazza and Baksh are responsible for the termination of dozens of NYCERS employees. One of those employees is actually being terminated for wearing jeans for one day to work after an office fire.