Showing posts with label OMB. Show all posts
Showing posts with label OMB. Show all posts

Wednesday, February 19, 2025

A Four Year Delay in the NYCERS LRP Project - Time for DOI to Investigate

In its FY-2024 financial report (released in December 2024), NYCERS stated that there was a serious delay in completing its Legacy Replacement Project with only a vague reference to changes in the legacy systems. NYCERS promised a report with a new schedule at its February 2025 Board meeting. See the text below:

LRP began in June 2021, with a plan to complete the transformation over five years/five phases, with a target completion of September 2026.

Phase 1 was launched in January 2023, introducing foundational functionality that future phases will build upon.

In the midst of Phase 2 delivery, a range of legacy system changes surfaced that impacted the overall timeline. The Systems Integrator proposed to deliver a subset of Phase 2, called Phase 2.0, as this functionality did not rely on those legacy system changes, and we are currently on track for a January 2025 launch.

In parallel to a Phase 2.0 delivery, the Systems Integrator and NYCERS are working on a re-baseline plan for the remaining phases, which will be discussed during the February 2025 Board of Trustees Meeting.

February 2025 Board of Trustee Meeting

Last week at that meeting, the staff reported to the trustees that the new tentative completion date for the LRP project would be at the end of 2030 rather than the original September 2026 date. That is over four years behind schedule for a five-year contract.

Since December, Accenture (the "systems integrator"), the firm developing the project, delivered a revised high-level plan for the completion of the remaining scope of the project with a target date as of the end of 2030. The NYCERS staff stated that it had reviewed this plan.

Going forward, Accenture will provide a detailed resource plan supporting the 2030 completion target date. This detailed plan is needed for NYCERS to be able to give final approval for the new plan. The NYCERS approval of this new plan is targeted for the spring of 2025.

After a two-minute presentation there were no questions from the trustees concerning this four-year delay. This is obscene.

Background

NYCERS started the LRP project in July 2015. It was the brain child of Liz Reyes, the IT director at the time. She now is the deputy executive director and is hoping to become the executive director in May when the incumbent retires.

NYCERS signed the LRP implementation contract with Accenture in April 2021. It had an approximate term of five years with a total cost of $85.1M.

Three years later in 2024, Accenture notified NYCERS that the September 2026 completion date was not achievable.

When does gross incompetence become criminal?

I am not aware of any evidence of corruption involving the LRP project.

However, NYCERS’s glaring incompetence and obvious inattention to the project’s risks raises red flags that should be investigated.

NYCERS has never produced a cost/benefit analysis for this project.

Gartner has been under contract to NYCERS since 2015 providing advice on the LRP project. What was that advice?

During 2019 and 2020, NYCERS paid Accenture approximately $12M to install a Salesforce application. This means that Accenture has had extensive experience with NYCERS’s operations. Why did it take Accenture three years to come up with a new completion date four years out from September 2026?

Sunday, January 19, 2025

The Legacy Replacement Project on Life Support

Collapse of the Legacy Replacement Project - Update 1/14/2025

I just recently commmented on spending problems with the Legacy Replacement Project at NYCERS.

Days later I became aware of a statement in the NYCERS FY-2024 NYCERS financial report, pages 12-13. The report was released in late December 2024, roughly three weeks ago. The statement indicates serious problems with LRP project. Below is the quote.

Quote from FY-2024 NYCERS ACFR

LRP began in June 2021, with a plan to complete the transformation over five years/five phases, with a target completion of September 2026.

Phase 1 was launched in January 2023, introducing foundational functionality that future phases will build upon.

In the midst of Phase 2 delivery, a range of legacy system changes surfaced that impacted the overall timeline. The Systems Integrator proposed to deliver a subset of Phase 2, called Phase 2.0, as this functionality did not rely on those legacy system changes, and we are currently on track for a January 2025 launch.

In parallel to a Phase 2.0 delivery, the Systems Integrator and NYCERS are working on a re-baseline plan for the remaining phases, which will be discussed during the February 2025 Board of Trustees Meeting.

The quote opens with an inaccurate statement that the LRP project started in FY-2021. It started in FY-2016. The project is now in its tenth year, FY-2025. It is also not responsible to say that it will be completed by September 2026.

The real problem, however, is raised in the highlighted text in the quote. As stated in the previous year's ACFR, Phase 2 was projected to "launch" in September 2024. That target has now vanished.

NYCERS states that at some point during FY-2024 a "range of legacy system changes" surfaced which impacted the Phase 2 timeline. At that point NYCERS was in the midest of the ninth year of the project or the third year of the Accenture contract. NYCERS gives no specific details of what the "changes" are and how they impact the project. I suspect that the scale of the legacy systems are overwhelming the standard Penfax software application which NYCERS contracted to handle the legacy functions. This obstacle will either force a redesign of the project with an associated delay or a revelauation of the total project.

NYCERS states that it will discuss a new timeline at the Febuary 2025 Board of Trustees meeting. That should be an interesting meeting.

The new Phase 2.0 is stripped down application that does not support any of the functions of the legacy systems. This minimal application has a delivery date of January 2025. This date is four months after the Septemebr 2024 date for the original Phase 2.

It now appears that the excutive director will be retiring on May 1, 2025 after seven and half years at NYCERS.

This project is out of control.

NYCERS CAFR/ACFR Comments on the Legacy Replacement Project since 2016

In light of the chaos described above, please refer to the quotes below from NYCERS annual financial statements from 2016 to 2024. The quotes are updates on what is happening with Legacy Replacement Project. Obviously NYCERS never thinks that anyone will backcheck what they said the year before.

I will let the quotes speak for themselves.

2016

NYCERS has embarked on a multi-year project to modernize our business processes and related technology. The principal objective of this initiative is to replace our legacy data processing environment and establish a new Pension Administration System that will transform the way we do business and interact with our members, pensioners, and various stakeholders such as employers and other City agencies. The intended outcome is to provide streamlined services in a modern context using up-to-date technologies that are flexible and provide value in an ever-changing environment.

2017

NYCERS is on a journey of transformation through the accomplishment of key initiatives that will span the next 5 to 6 years. We have been preparing for our upcoming multi-year legacy system replacement project, including developing the Request for Proposals, data analysis and data cleansing.

2018

During fiscal year 2018, NYCERS continued along the journey of transformation through the accomplishment of several key initiatives designed to help us deliver a world-class customer experience and enhance our operations, while preparing for the replacement of our legacy systems.

2019

The Legacy Replacement Project (LRP) is a multi-year initiative to modernize NYCERS’ business processes and related technologies. The principal objective of the LRP is to replace NYCERS’ legacy production application with a new pension administration system. This new pension administration system is intended to transform the way NYCERS does business and interacts with its members, retirees, employers, and other City agencies. This will be accomplished using flexible up-to-date technologies that will provide ongoing value into the future.

NYCERS issued a Request for Proposal (RFP) for the LRP on April 18, 2019. Proposals were received on July 15, 2019 and are currently under review.

2020

The Legacy Replacement Project (LRP) is a multi-year initiative to modernize NYCERS’ business processes and related technologies. The principal objective of the LRP is to replace NYCERS’ legacy production application with a new pension administration system. This new pension administration system is intended to transform the way NYCERS does business and interacts with its members, retirees, employers, and other City agencies. This will be accomplished using flexible up-to-date technologies that will provide ongoing value into the future.

NYCERS issued a Request for Proposal (RFP) for the LRP on April 18, 2019 and expects to complete contract negotiations with the selected vendor by December 31, 2020.

2021

The Legacy Replacement Project (LRP) is a multi-year initiative to modernize NYCERS’ business processes and related technologies. The principal objective of the LRP is to replace NYCERS’ legacy production application with a new pension administration system. This new pension administration system is intended to transform the way NYCERS does business and interacts with its members, retirees, employers, and other City agencies. This will be accomplished using flexible up-to-date technologies that will provide ongoing value into the future.

The LRP will be completed over five phases. Phase 1 began on June 22, 2021. It is anticipated each phase will take approximately one year to complete.

2022

The Legacy Replacement Project (LRP) is a multi-year initiative to modernize NYCERS’ business processes and related technologies. The principal objective of the LRP is to replace NYCERS’ legacy production application with a new pension administration system. This new pension administration system is intended to transform the way NYCERS does business and interacts with its members, retirees, employers, and other City agencies. This will be accomplished using flexible up-to-date technologies that will provide ongoing value into the future.

The LRP began in June 2021 and is expected to be completed by June 2026 over five phases.

Phase 1 is scheduled to launch in January 2023.

2023

The Legacy Replacement Project (LRP) is a multi-year initiative to modernize NYCERS’ business processes and related technologies. The principal objective of the LRP is to replace NYCERS’ legacy production application with a new pension administration system. This new pension administration system is intended to transform the way NYCERS does business and interacts with its members, retirees, employers, and other City agencies. This will be accomplished using flexible up-to-date technologies that will provide ongoing value into the future.

The LRP began in June 2021 and is expected to be completed by June 2026 over five phases. Phase 1 launched in January 2023. Phase 2 is currently scheduled to launch in September 2024.

2024

The Legacy Replacement Project (LRP) is a complex, multi-year initiative to modernize NYCERS’ business processes and related technologies. The principal objective of the LRP is to replace NYCERS’ legacy production application with a new pension administration system. This new pension administration system will transform the way NYCERS does business and interacts with its members, retirees, employers, and other City agencies. This will be accomplished using flexible up-to-date technologies that will provide ongoing value into the future.

LRP began in June 2021, with a plan to complete the transformation over five years/five phases, with a target completion of September 2026. >p> Phase 1 was launched in January 2023, introducing foundational functionality that future phases will build upon.

In the midst of Phase 2 delivery, a range of legacy system changes surfaced that impacted the overall timeline. The Systems Integrator proposed to deliver a subset of Phase 2, called Phase 2.0, as this functionality did not rely on those legacy system changes, and we are currently on track for a January 2025 launch.

In parallel to a Phase 2.0 delivery, the Systems Integrator and NYCERS are working on a re-baseline plan for the remaining phases, which will be discussed during the February 2025 Board of Trustees Meeting.

Monday, August 5, 2024

Employers Should Hire Medicare to Manage Health Insurance Benefits

Proposal

Major employers who want to provide health insurance to their employees should seriously consider pushing for a process to enable Medicare to manage paying the medical bills for their employees and then have the employer reimburse Medicare for the charges with a 3% administrative charge. The employer can choose to cover the full cost or have the employees contribute part of the cost.

Medicare is accepted by most doctors and hospitals all over the United States. In my opinion Medicare is arguably the best health insurance in the US even at 80% coverage. The non covered 20% can be purchased at approximately $200 per month. There are no pre-approval obstacles for needed treatments. Medicare has a good reputation for paying promptly. And the reimbursements to Medicare would be significantly lower than the payments for commercial health insurance. The trend line for Medicare annual cost increases is much lower than commercial insurance.

Annual Medical Cost Data for NYC Employees and Retirees

I recently posted a note outlining the increased cost for health insurance for NYC employees and retirees for the FY-2014 to FY-2023 period. I have done further analysis on the cost data from OLR for the period from 2014 to 2024 period.

Using the GHI charge for Senior Care (20% of the amount paid by Medicare) the health insurance cost for the average Medicare retiree & family in FY-2014 was $12,999 based on the $2,599 payment to Senior Care.

The full cost in FY-2024 was $16,404 based on the $3,280 payment to Senior Care. That was a 26% increase over ten years.

In contrast, the cost for the average employee and family was $10,949 in FY-2014 and $24,325 in FY-2024 (GHI coverage). That is a 122% increase over ten years

The cost of the average non-Medicare retiree and family was $13,080 in FY-2014 and $28,539 in FY-2024 (GHI coverage). That is a 118% increase over ten years.

Medicare retirees usually have more health benefit claims than employees but have smaller families. So, the levels of claims are probably very comparable but not the costs. EmblemHeath administers GHI coverage for NYC. NYC pays EmblemHeath 96% of its $8.4B annual health insurance costs.

Recap

NYC Average Annual Health Insurance Costs
FY-2014FY- 2024% increase over 10 years
Senior Care Costs (20%)$2,599$3,28026%
100% Medicare Retiree Costs $12,999$16,40426%
Employee Costs$10,949$24,325122%
Non- Medicare Retiree$13,080$28,539118%

Sunday, May 10, 2015

Budget Insanity at NYCERS

On March 12, 2015 the NYCERS Trustees approved the NYCERS FY-2016 administrative budget. It was Diane D'Alessandro's tenth annual adiministrative budget proposal as executive director.

The key numbers are listed in the table below. For comparison purposes I added FY-2006, my last budget as executive director, and FY-1996, NYCERS's last budget under the city's budget structure. The 1996 budget was draconian to say the least. You can see from the table that the NYCERS's budget has increased by 43% over the last ten years or 4.1%/year.

NYCERS: Admin. Budget Over the Years

FY-2016FY-2006FY-1996
FT Positions 401342155
PT Positions 35 130
PS $30.2M $20.0M$6.2M
OTPS $19.4M $14.7M$2.6M
Sub-total $49.6M $34.7M$8.8M
Fringe $8.2M $4.1M$0
Total $57.8M $38.8M$8.8M

What is extraordinary about this budget is that it is the beginning of a delusional spending spree on IT upgrades. It is being called the "Legacy Replacement Project". It proposes to spend $132M over a five year period, staring with $500,000 to be paid to Gartner, Inc. and $1.75M to other consultants to be named later. At the meeting D'Alessandro indicated that she was going to pay $310,000 to an outside firm to write a RFP for this "grand" project. Listed below is the five year spending bonanza.

  • 2016 - $ 2.25M
  • 2017 - $ 9.91M
  • 2018 - $27.86M
  • 2019 - $46.00M
  • 2020 - $46.24M

To OMB's credit they complained about the $310,000 RFP. The trustees, however, approved this budget in spite of making noise about the long term cost of the project.

You would think, considering how well funded that the NYCERS budget is, that the NYCERS staff would be able to write their own RFP. But D'Alessandro got that part right, her staff can't do the job.

Of course, without the results of the RFP where did the $132M amount come from.

In fact over the last ten years D'Alessandro should have been standardizing NYCERS applications on a current client/server platform using a relational database system. This process was underway in 2005 when she first appointed. But thankfully the old CICS/VSAM systems were so well made that they have survived long after the point when they should have been retired. Thank God for small favors.

D'Alessandro, unfortunately, was appointed to her current job in 2005 without any prior relevant experience by Martha Stark and a bunch of compromised trustees. D'Alessandro had never managed anyone. She is not a lawyer, nor an accountant, nor an actuary. She had never worked for a pension system and she had absolutely no IT experience. What she was and still is, is grossly incompetent.

To make the situation worse, the current IT director was working as the NYCERS call center manager when D'Alessandro moved her to the agency's IT division in 2007. At that point she had no IT experience either. Six months later D'Alessandro makes her the director of the IT division. It reminds of when Rudy put a key punch salesman in charge of DoITT. She is as incompetent as D'Alessandro.

D'Alessandro submitted a five page justifying her budget proposal. It is a classic example of using a lot of words to create a fog, lots of hand waving and saying nothing except give me $132M. I actually don't think D'Alessandro wrote the summary. Five pages is far too much work for D'Alessandro. It looks like a cut and paste job from some marketing crap.

This is the justification for $132M.

MAJOR PROJECTS

In a continued effort to provide greater operational efficiency, enhanced customer service and improved quality and production, NYCERS is proposing to undertake a major information technology (IT) and business system replacement project that will streamline and consolidate all applications and functions into a single data repository for common use throughout the agency.

The project which will be known as the Legacy Replacement Project (LRP) will be conducted in three stages over a minimum of five years. The LRP will require a commitment of resources to be phased in over that time.

In order to ensure the success of the LRP, NYCERS is proposing two associated projects including a communications project designed to accommodate expanded electronic interaction with clients and a change management project to address staff training, coaching, and leadership development needs.

You can always spot a IT disaster from the start. It has a long time frame and they don't tell you what they are going to do in the first week of the project, the second week of the project, third week of the project,... You get the picture. Oh yeah, it will also cost a lot of money. I will guarantee you that this project will fail.

When I left NYCERS in 2005, NYCERS had one of the best IT departments in the city. The agency had:

  1. between 60 and 65 IT professionals on staff
  2. an integrated mainframe (VSE) and a network system (Windows Server 2003)
  3. all major work operations automated running under CICS using VSAM and DB2
  4. an advanced web site which allowed members and retirees to view their own specific data.
  5. an imaging/workflow system covering all paper based applications for all members and pensioners.
  6. a dedicated document scanning division
  7. a tested computer disaster recovery plan (we were researching a full business recovery plan and site)
  8. a standardized accounting package running on the network supporting both pension and administrative operations
  9. a nightly backup process of all files including the Exchange Server
  10. a project to upgrade major applications to DB2.
  11. an advanced Avaya based call center with its own backup PBX.
  12. a modern customer service center with its own integrated queuing system
  13. an on-site fully equipped training center.
  14. a proximity card system for both time keeping and security.
  15. a separate network system for the security and a full camera subsystem.

Returning to the executive summary, it is not only short on details about the project but it also has a great deal of deceptive information. The following are a few quotes out of D'Alessandro's write-up along with some clarifying comments.

RECENT HISTORY

Over the past nine years, NYCERS has made significant infrastructure improvements.

Document Management

NYCERS continues to ensure the preservation and security of all vital records and to promote an environmentally sound approach to document management. This effort includes the incorporation of all incoming documents into the NYCEWORK system in an electronic format and the ongoing digitization of historical paper documents.

In 2014, NYCERS prepared, scanned and indexed over 200,000 incoming documents and converted over 1 million historical records into digital images. Since the inception of the document management project, over 38 million paper records have been imaged, saving approximately $600,000 in document storage fees.

From this quote you would think that document management was introduced during the last few years. In fact, it was there when D'Alessandro walked in the door. The system in place at that time used a software package called Staffware. It was working well but it was being stressed by the volume of documents that NYCERS was dealing with. It actually continued to function up until 2014 when a new software package, Filenet/NYCEWORK, was finally put into production. I wonder where the $600,000 in saved storage fees came from?

Unfortunately, while Staffware needed to be either upgraded or replaced, Filenet runs significantly slower than Staffware did. That in turn has created incremental delays at every step of every process in the agency. It has created havoc with the production levels for all major functions in the agency.

This is an example of a mismanaged project being put into production so that management doesn't have to say it made a mistake. We saw this problem with the CityTime project.

While we are talking about mistakes, there have been two major IT disasters at NYCERS in the last nine years costing millions of dollars. One was the DB2 project and the other is the infamous Long Island City disaster recovery site. At least when the DB2 project was cancelled, the bleeding stopped. The LIC-DR project is a never ending cancer.

When I left NYCERS in 2005, the IT department with the help of two consultants was slowly converting over our major VSAM files to a DB2 relational database platform. We had already had two significant systems running under DB2 but there was a long term need to shift all major files over to the relational model. Two months after I left the project was cancelled. Subsequently NYCERS entered into a contract with IBM/Blue-Phoenix to do the DB2 conversion. That project dragged on for years, cost millions, and eventually failed. NYCERS even tried to sue IBM but with very little relief.

Business Continuity

The Long Island City business recovery site enables NYCERS to restore business operations and critical applications in the event of a disaster. This ensures the sustainability of operations and reduces the potential for data loss. Business recovery time is within four hours and the data recovery point is within 30 minutes.

From this quote you would conclude LIC-DR is a success. That is not true in any sense.

The lease on the LIC-DR project was signed in 2006 and NYCERS still does not have a Certificate of Occupancy for the site. I have previously written about this mess. It is not clear what is the legal status of having employees on that site.

For the record, the rent at LIC-DR is $530,000 for FY-2016 plus another $400,000 for other ancillary lease charges. The site has serious water leakage, asbestos, and plumbing problem. The lease comes up for renewal in the spring of 2016. Let's see what the decision will be then.

And in this season of delusion, NYCERS is planning a tertiary disaster recovery site. They even started buying hardware ($250,000 in FY-2015) for this mythical site. Some people just don't get it.

Business Process Automation

NYCERS continues to streamline business processes and leverage infrastructure investments to improve service delivery. As a result, NYCERS has achieved efficiencies in areas including loans and survivor benefits. On-line loan processing time has been reduced from 10 business days to five business days.

In this quote D'Alessandro appears to claim to have automated loans and survivor benefits in the last nine years and that the turnaround time on loans has been dropped from 10 to 5 days. Actually in 2005 both loans and survivor benefits were fully automated. The loans were the first applications automated in the early 1980's and also the first application to be integrated into the imaging/workflow system in 2002. In 2005, if you filed a loan application by Tuesday, NYCERS mailed a loan check to you that Friday. You would wonder why D'Alessandro would have made the above statement.

While all this craziness was going on with the great IT upgrade, D'Alessandro also threw in a request for 12 new employees with salaries of $720,000. No explanation was given. This was on top of 6 new employees in FY-2015, again with no explanation. Since 2013 the full time staff has gone from 372 to 401 and part time staff from 12 to 35. Why are there back logs with production work? Can you imagine what A.C.S. could do with that kind personnel increase.

Wednesday, March 20, 2013

A Small Touch of Lunacy

This is an old posting from 2009. Someone recently asked me a question about this issue. I realized I had withdrawn this posting. The content is still relevant today except for the change in the interest rate from 8% to 7% as of July 1, 2011 and that we now know that any decision Martha Stark was involved with must be viewed with skepticism. Also in an unsettling way this subsidy has grown. In FY-2012 NYCERS paid the Comptroller's Office $1.98M.

In 2004, Martha Stark and the other NYCERS trustees decided to start paying the NYC Comptroller’s Office for investment functions which the city had previously funded through the regular city budget process. See NYCERS resolution R#1 adopted on April 27, 2004.

These payments to the Comptroller show up in his city budget as non-governmental grant revenues. It appears that other city pension funds have also adopted this payment scheme. As a reference, this “grant” money to the Comptroller's Office was $4,167,779 in FY-2010 and $4,169,799 in FY-2011.

The city, however, must by statute reimburse NYCERS two years later for these payments to the Comptroller along with 8% interest per annum.

Correction: These payments to the Comptroller are being considered investment expenses under Setion 13-705.b of the NYC Admin. Code. See quote below. The impact of this interpretation is that these payments are blended into the city's annual pension cost and spread out over long periods of time. After eleven years of these payments, however, the annual charge is getting close to full replacement in the following year.

b. Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, such expenses as may necessarily be incurred by a retirement system in acquiring, managing and protecting investments of its funds may be paid from any income, interest or dividends derived from deposits or investments of such funds.

If this all sounds confusing to you, that is because it is confusing.

It is also deceptive. When the City Council sees a non-governmental grant in an agency’s revenue budget, the Council correctly concludes that the tax payers of the City of New York are not funding that revenue stream. In this case, however, the taxpayers are in fact not only funding this revenue stream but also incurring a debt which becomes due in future years with an 8% or 7%(net of fees) annual interest rate.

Why would the mayor’s representative on the NYCERS Board agree to this distorted budget scheme, saddle the city with an 8% debt, and create this deception in the city budget. Why not just let OMB allocate the necessary funds to the Comptroller’s expense budget to cover the statutory investment work?

Maybe OMB thought that the Comptroller already had sufficient funds to do the work. Maybe OMB didn’t know that NYC Admin. Code mandates that the city repay the “grant”, with interest, to NYCERS. Maybe the “grant” funding allows the Comptroller to escape some types of oversight, like salary limitations. Maybe city hall, in fact, didn’t know about this payment scheme at all. Maybe, maybe, maybe…

Of course, once the NYCERS trustees decided to start paying for these investment services, shouldn’t the board have sought open bids or issued an RFP for these investment services? The trustees could also have hired internal NYCERS staff to perform the investment functions. Both of these approaches are covered by state statue and would not have distorted the city budget.

There is, however, no statutory way for NYCERS to enter into a contract with the Comptroller who is a also a NYCERS trustee. There is, also, a blatant conflict of interest in the fact that the Comptroller is the legal auditor of all NYCERS expenditures including these payments to the Comptroller (NYC-AC Section 13-103.g).

Listed below are actual payments from NYCERS to the Comptroller’s Office for the period from April, 2008 to March 31, 2010.

PeriodTotal PSFringe Fringe Adj. OTPS
April-June, 2008 $405,967$235,981$91,985$44,202$33,798
Post June, 2008 $33,814$20,541$8,007$0$5,266
July-Sept, 2008 $294,917$208,957$81,452$0$4,508
Oct-Dec, 2008 $302,206$210,237$81,951$0$10,018
Jan-March, 2009 $390,613$253,171$109,674$17,921$9,848
April-June, 2009 $351,700$240,901$104,358$0$6,440
Post June, 2009 $17,976 $236$102$0$17,638
July-Sept, 2009 $331,533$232,050$90,453$0$9,030
Oct-Dec, 2009 $307,236$217,659$8,843$0$4,734
Jan-March, 2010 $343,716$243,217$102,686-$4,730$2,543

These figures are a detailed accounting of what money NYCERS is giving to the Comptroller's Office. There is, however, no detail of how the Comptroller is actually spending the money.

For example, which of the Comptroller's employees are being billed to NYCERS, what are their salaries, what are their duties, how many hours a week are they doing NYCERS work, what are their qualifications, what is their work product and how is that work product evaluated. This all would have required the preparation of a detailed scope of services and this was never done.

Sunday, February 7, 2010

Who's Minding the Store: Paying $143M to lose $7.8B.

Review of NYCERS Investments for FY-2009: $7.8B loss and $143M fees

On December 31, 2009, NYCERS submitted its FY-2009 financial report (CAFR) to the national government finance association (GFOA) in Chicago.

The bottom line on NYCERS income statement showed a loss of $7.8B. That is a 19.6% loss in assets ($31.9B down from $39.7B).

For this disaster, NYCERS paid $143M in investment fees and expenses. The city and other participating employers must replace the $143M with 8% interest in FY-2010. As a reference, NYCERS paid $45M in investment expenses in FY-2003. This cost explosion is a recent development.

You can see a breakdown on the specific investment classes on a chart that I recently posted. It outlines each class’s performance and expenses for FY-2009.

As listed in the chart there are 23 asset classes. This strategy is much too fragmented and expensive for any pension plan and far too risky for a pension plan that has an annual benefit payout obligation equal to 11% of assets ($3.3B benefits, $31.9B assets).

On the rational side of this strategy, there are six of the classes with assets of $17.1B and annual expenses of $4.6M.

On the truly out of control side of this strategy, there are two classes with assets of $2.7B and annual costs of $99.7M.

It is clear to me 1) that the six classes are totally sufficient for NYCERS investment needs, 2) that NYCERS would save well over $120M per year in fees using only the six classes, and 3) that the six classes would produce a higher rate of return than the 23 class scheme.

Unfortunately, even if sanity would return to the trustees, the Comptroller's office has signed contracts that require NYCERS to submit to this legal rape and pillage. The best NYCERS could do is to stop the bleeding and drop whatever contracts that have an opt-out clause.

The trustees also need to change the investment consultant function. They need to hire a totally independent advisor with no income coming from investment managers. The consultant must commit significantly more resources to assist the trustees. The consultant must have a permanent presence at the NYCERS site so that he/she can perform comprehensive analysis of manager’s performance and be available to all trustees on daily basis.

This consulting function would most likely cost about $10M a year. It is, however, far better to have the consultant earn his/her profit from NYCERS rather than from the managers that he/she is suppose to audit and monitor.

The following are comments about specific asset classes

US Stocks

The work horse of the NYCERS portfolio is the indexed domestic stock class. Its value on June 30, 2009 was $10.0B, 31% of the total portfolio. Last year was a disaster with a -26.44% loss in this class. This class, however, always has the saving grace of having almost no cost. The 2009 fees were only 0.3 basis point of assets managed. Yes, that is less than one basis point. The annual return over the last 15 years is 6.98%.

Comment on reported returns: The Comptroller, on a quarterly basis, reports rates of return for individual managers. He/she provides no data or calculations to support the accuracy of these rates of returns.

In contrast, NYCERS actively managed domestic stock class had a -25.11% return before fees were paid. The 2009 fees were 24.0 basis points. The annual return, however, over the last 15 year is 6.26%, gross of fees. This class is a waste of time and very expensive. Pension funds should not be involved with this asset class. This is a touchy subject because of industry wide implications of this position.

A particularly questionable asset class is the domestic stocks - minority managers class. This class had a return of -27.66%. This performance is worse than other active managers. The 2009 fees for this class were 68.8 basis points. Any attempt to provide opportunities to minority managers legally should not cause any increased expense to NYCERS. This asset class borders on gross negligence by the trustees. The NYC Law Department has failed to properly advise their clients of their fiduciary obligations.

Minority managers also appear in the bond and international stock classes. The comments made above are also relevant in these two other classes

International Stocks

Actively managed international stocks had a return of -32.2% last year, gross of fees. The 2009 fees were 32.6 basis points. This class has had extensive turnover the last three years reflecting the risk in this area. It also has the same performance flaw as the actively managed domestic stock class. International stock exposure should be handled on a country structured indexed basis.

NYCERS indexed international stock manager had a return of -30.68% last year, gross of fees. The 2009 fees were 1.7 basis points. This class needs to be broken down to a country grouping. As an example, Japan has a heavy weight in this index and has pulled down the index’s performance.

The emerging market stock class had a return of -31.41% in 2009, gross of fees. The fees were 36.9 basis points. This class should also be shifted into the index class. If a country doesn’t have a reasonable index, NYCERS should not be invested in that country.

US Bonds

NYCERS has a long standing effective domestic bond program. Listed below are the four traditional classes with their 2009 returns and fees:

  1. investment grade corporate bonds, return = 2.44%, fees = 2.6 basis points

  2. government bonds, return = 7.04%, fees = 7.4 basis points

  3. mortgage backed bonds, return = 6.26%, fees = 7.0 basis points

  4. dollar denominated foreign bonds, return = -5.62%, fees = 7.7 basis points

  5. .

The dollar denominated foreign bond class performed poorly in 2009 but has a good performance history and its fees are comparable to that of domestic corporate bond class.

The high risk domestic bond class had a -1.28% return last year, gross of fees. The fees were 27.9 basis points. The annual return for the last ten years has been 4.88% while the corporate bond return has been 5.58% and has fees in the range of 7.4 basis points. This high risk class just can not compete with high grade corporate bonds.

In 2008, NYCERS began investing in convertible bonds. This class is just inappropriate for a large pension fund which has both equity and fixed income investments. The return was -13.19% and the fees were 39.2 basis points. The high basis point number is a tip off to stupidity.

The actively managed inflation protected government bond (TIPS) class is too expensive when compared to the standard government bond class. The inflation protection is not sufficient to justify this class’s severely discounted rate of return. This also applies to the index TIPS class.

Unregistered Investments

At the end of the list of investment classes are two classes that have gotten completely out of control. They are private equity and real estate partnerships. Both classes are illiquid and have no published market value.

The fees for private equity were $81.7M and for real estate were $15.3M. The consulting fees for these two classes were $2.7M

This is 70% of the total annual investment expenses for the entire portfolio but the asset classes have a book value of only $2.7B or 8.8% of the portfolio. The private equity class has 116 partnerships. NYCERS did not report fees paid for 26 of them. The real estate class has 30 partnerships. NYCERS did not report fees for 8 of them. This is a sign of NYCERS's lack of financial control over the payment of fees to all managers. What is particularly questionable about these two classes is that $25M of the $99.7M is classified as organizational costs. That means NYCERS is not reporting who or why this money was paid. There is a high potential for fraud when controls are not present.

While NYCERS does not report rates of return on either of these classes, the real estate class dropped in value from $1.2B to $.886B in FY-2009.

Conclusion

In hind sight, it is always easy to criticize. The trustees’ investment decisions over the last ten years, however, have been purposely aggressive. This was done in the hope of keeping employer contributions lower than they would have been if the trustees had followed a more conservative strategy. It is perverse that, overall, the conservative strategy would have been less expensive for the employers. This is the price of incompetence.

While there is a growing funding problem at NYCERS (it is much worse at the other four city systems) caused partly by benefit enhancements that were enacted in 2000, the main source of this problem is the underfunding by participating employers and the investment failures by the NYCERS trustees.

I will not even comment on the campaign contribution issue.